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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Here are some of the factors that judges and scholars have identified as 
influencing on how a judge decides a case: logic;2F1 experience;3F2 precedent;4F3 
policy preferences; 5F4 legal ideology; 6F5 political ideology; 7F6 a desire to appear 
independent;8F7 the judge’s method of constitutional interpretation;9F8 a desire 
to limit workload; 10F9 an orientation toward social and political elites; 11F10 a 
tendency towards rationality;12F11 a need for the esteem of others;13F12 the doctrine 
of stare decisis; 14F13 the ability to translate a stance into an effective written 
opinion; 1 5F14 the type of reasoning process used by the judge; 1 6F15 the need to 
 
 1.  See generally WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
(Oxford Univ. Press 2016) (1765). 
 2.  See generally O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 471 
(1897). 
 3.  See generally MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT (2008). 
 4.  HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR MINORITY WILL: 
ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 7 (1999) (explaining that some 
argue “that precedent is not influential” because “it merely cloaks the justices’ personal 
policy preferences”). 
 5.  See Lawrence Baum, Motivation and Judicial Behavior: Expanding the Scope 
of Inquiry, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 3, 19 (David Klein & Gregory 
Mitchell eds., 2010) (identifying good legal policy as the ultimate goal of most judicial decisions). 
 6.  See generally, e.g., Christopher Zorn & Jennifer Barnes Bowie, Ideological 
Influences on Decision Making in the Federal Judicial Hierarchy: An Empirical Assessment, 
72 J. POL. 1212 (2010). 
 7.  April Hefner, Honorable John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice of the United States, 
Speaks at Belmont University, BELMONT U. (Feb. 7, 2019), http://news.belmont.edu/honorable- 
john-g-roberts-jr-chief-justice-of-the-united-states-speaks-at-belmont-university/ [https:// 
perma.cc/2K8J-452W]. 
 8.  E.g., GERHARDT, supra note 3, at 95 (discussing textualist versus living constitution 
philosophies of constitutional interpretation). 
 9.  Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Robert J. MacCoun & John M. Darley, Multiple Constraint 
Satisfaction in Judging, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING, supra note 
5, at 27, 32. 
 10.  NEAL DEVINS & LAWRENCE BAUM, THE COMPANY THEY KEEP: HOW PARTISAN 
DIVISIONS CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT 25 (2019). 
 11.  See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (7th ed. 2007). 
 12.  Neal Devins & Will Federspiel, The Supreme Court, Social Psychology, and 
Group Formation, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING, supra note 5, at 
85, 92 (“[T]he types of people who end up with judicial positions tend to be those who 
care a great deal about the esteem of others.”). 
 13.  LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE SUPREME COURT 112 (2006). 
 14.  See Dahlia Lithwick, Anthony Kennedy’s Right to Choose: The Justice Who 
Cares About Dignity and Autonomy Should Vote Against Texas’ Abortion Law., SLATE (Nov. 
17, 2015, 3:08 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2015/11/kennedy-and-supreme-
court-should-vote-against-texas-abortion-law-in-cole.html [https://perma.cc/J2GM-56UN]. 
 15.  E.g., Brandon L. Bartels, Top-Down and Bottom-Up Models of Judicial Reasoning, 
in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING, supra note 5, at 41, 41. 
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project stability, predictability, and legitimacy;17F16 the need to act strategically 
with respect to other judges so as to garner support in an opinion; 18F17 and a 
judge’s level of integrity, intellect, expertise, competence, education, training, 
and temperament.19F18  And now here are more: values,20F19 norms and tradition,21F20 
ethics and morals, 2 2F21 intuition, 2 3F22 the attitudinal disposition of the judge,24F23 
a desire to garner unanimous decisions, 2 5 F24 situational determinants, 26F25 
the disposition of the Office of the Solicitor General,27F26 a desire to “do 
justice,”28F27 the number of amicus briefs filed and the number of such briefs 
authored by academics at elite law schools, 29F28 the coalitional dynamics of 
the court,30F29 the roll of a die,31F30 how long it has been since the judge has eaten,32F31 
and whether the judge has overeaten at lunch. 33F32 
 
 16.  THOMAS G. HANSFORD & JAMES F. SPRIGGS II, THE POLITICS OF PRECEDENT ON 
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 12–13 (2006) (discussing the necessity of stability, predictability, 
and legitimacy for compliance). 
 17.  WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 13, at 192. 
 18.  Id. at 22–23. 
 19.  Id. at 124 (explaining the wider latitude Supreme Court Justices have to rely on 
values). 
 20.  GERHARDT, supra note 3, at 3–4 (explaining how precedent can often include 
norms and traditions that Justices have chosen to follow). 
 21.  E.g., Lithwick, supra note 14 (quoting Justice Kennedy’s discussion of making 
sure his decisions accord with his own sense of ethics and morality). 
 22.  See generally Jonathan Haidt, Moral Psychology and the Law: How Intuitions 
Drive Reasoning, Judgment, and the Search for Evidence, 64 ALA L. REV. 867 (2013) (arguing 
that intuition comes before strategic reasoning in legal thought). 
 23.  ROBERT J. HUME, JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR AND POLICYMAKING: AN INTRODUCTION 
34 (2018). 
 24.  See LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, JR., TEN LITTLE-KNOWN FACTS ABOUT THE SUPREME 
COURT 24 (2016) (discussing Justice Roberts’s minimalist approach in an attempt to foster 
unanimity). 
 25.  WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 13, at 236. 
 26.  Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Persuasion in the Decision Making of U.S. Supreme 
Court Justices, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING, supra note 5, at 57, 
65. 
 27.  See LORD DENNING, THE FAMILY STORY 174 (1981). 
 28.  DEVINS & BAUM, supra note 10, at 46, 48. 
 29.  Devins & Federspiel, supra note 12, at 89. 
 30.  Birte Englich, Thomas Mussweiler & Fritz Strack, Playing Dice with Criminal 
Sentences: The Influence of Irrelevant Anchors on Experts’ Judicial Decision Making , 
32 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 188, 190, 194–95 (2006). 
 31.  See generally Shai Danziger, Jonathan Levav & Liora Avnaim-Pesso, Extraneous 
Factors in Judicial Decisions, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6889 (2011). 
 32.  JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 
162 (1973). 
BAST_PATRICK (DO NOT DELETE) 6/1/2020  3:46 PM 
 
360 
Like any decision, a judge’s ruling results from a complex interaction 
of a variety of influences.  Some of these are imposed by external forces 
such as the rules built into the legal system for deciding cases.  At minimum, 
a judge must at least feign respect for precedent and nod towards the 
doctrine of stare decisis.  Such procedural maxims apply equally to all 
judges—as do sentencing guidelines, rules of statutory interpretation, and 
the like.  But then there are internal influences, which might be particular 
to a given judge or to groups of judges, and which might guide their decision, 
whether they admit to it or not, such as their method of constitutional 
interpretation, or their underlying political ideology.  And these are the 
internal forces of which judges are aware.  There are still yet scores of other 
psychological biases that might dispose a judge without the judge ever having 
knowledge of the bias’s influence. 
When a judge decides a case, the judge provides—through a legal opinion 
—a written blueprint for the decision, meant to both justify the decision 
in the instant case and provide a record for future judges deciding like cases.  
These opinions preserve in fossil-like form the reasoning of their authors, 
building the logic of the decision from the ground up: describing the facts 
of the underlying dispute, introducing the relevant authority, and describing 
in detail why certain precedent controls the decision and others does not.  
These opinions are meant to provide a snout-to-tail explanation of a decision’s 
rationale—at least in theory. 
But in practice, however, legal opinions offer only the tip of the iceberg 
of all of the different factors that influence a judge’s decision.  Certain 
statistical models, for example, are able to predict judicial decisions blindly, 
based solely on the existing policy preferences of the judges. 34F33  Moreover, 
decades of psychological research has demonstrated that not only are people 
influenced by unconscious decision-making processes, but that even where 
people are informed of such unconscious processes, they often refuse to 
believe that such processes, even if real, actually influence their decisions.35F34  
Compounding this effect, people—judges included—also have a tendency to 
justify gut-level instincts with elaborate logical arguments that they arrive 
at only in an effort to defend their intuition. 36F35  A cynic can therefore view 
written judicial opinions as often little more than elaborate post hoc 
justifications for the initial instincts of judges.  In other words, it is often 
 
 33.  See, e.g., Theodore W. Ruger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: 
Legal and Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 
104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150, 1154 (2004); Zorn & Bowie, supra note 6, at 1212. 
 34.  See, e.g., John M. Darley & Bibb Latané, Bystander Intervention in Emergencies: 
Diffusion of Responsibility, 8 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 377 (1968); Richard E. Nisbett 
& Timothy DeCamp Wilson, Telling More than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental 
Processes, 84 PSYCHOL. REV. 231, 233 (1977). 
 35.  See generally Haidt, supra note 22. 
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difficult to glean from Supreme Court opinions what factors actually influenced 
the decision-making of the Justices. 
Sometimes, though, we are allowed a slightly more revealing peek 
behind the curtain.  In 2018, the United States Supreme Court decided 
Carpenter v. United States—a 5–4 decision regarding the Fourth Amendment 
protection attached to cell phone location records. 37F36  Carpenter was not 
completely split along traditional ideological lines, featured a wide range 
of precedential lines and theories of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence for 
the Justices to choose from, and featured four different dissents by the opposed 
Justices.  As a result—and much like other Supreme Court cases involving 
the use of new technology—Carpenter provides a unique window into the 
judicial decision-making process because many of the chief predictors for 
Supreme Court decision-making—ideological preference, precedent, coalitional 
side-taking—play a somewhat less instrumental role, and other aspects of 
the decision-making process rise to the surface and are rendered more 
susceptible to analysis. 
This Article will attempt to capitalize on this rare window.  After detailing 
many of the major factors that influence judicial decision-making, the 
Article will also delve into many of the underexplored influences on judicial 
psychology before turning finally to an analysis of how these various factors 
manifest in Carpenter.  Part II provides overviews of the membership of 
the United States Supreme Court, the process by which the Court decides 
cases, and the effect of precedent on the Court.  Part III discusses the various 
theories of what psychological forces influence Court decisions.  Part IV 
analyzes Carpenter and reflects on other privacy decisions of the last sixty 
years. 
II.  SCOTUS: MEMBERSHIP, THE DECISION PROCESS, AND PRECEDENT 
A.  Membership on the United States Supreme Court 
The membership of the United States Supreme Court determines the 
decisions the Court announces.  “[T]he Supreme Court is a political institution 
in the broadest sense, in that its members often possess long-term 
aspirations for what is best for the country, and their judicial opinions 
reflect these aspirations.” 38F37  When a President nominates someone for a 
vacancy on the United States Supreme Court, the President may be seeking 
 
 36.  138 S. Ct. 2206, 2206 (2018). 
 37.  WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 13, at 4. 
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someone who has “absolute personal and professional integrity, a lucid 
intellect, professional expertise and competence, appropriate professional 
educational background or training, the capacity to communicate clearly 
(especially in writing), and judicial temperament.” 39F38 
Some see politics as increasingly more polarized between Republican 
and Democratic camps, a trend that many believe began with the Republican 
landslide in Congress in 1994. 40F39  This polarization in the legislature may 
have had some effect on the judiciary. 41F40  Two scholars theorize that the 
Justices have begun to act more as advocates in oral arguments by directing 
challenging comments and questions at the attorneys representing the 
opposition while directing reinforcing comments and leading questions at 
the attorneys representing the side with which they agree or deflecting 
difficult comments and questions made by other Justices. 42F41 
The Justices are political figures, although not in the same sense as the 
President and members of Congress; however, some observers view the 
Court as more political than others.  Two scholars opine that ideology plays 
an increasingly important role in a President naming a nominee to the United 
States Supreme Court.  They point out that all five Justices appointed 
by Republican Presidents are conservatives with connections to the Federalist 
Society.4243F   When he was still a Presidential candidate, President Trump 
enlisted the aid of the Federalist Society and the Heritage Foundation to 
compile a list of potential nominees to the United States Supreme Court; 
Justice Kavanaugh made that list in 2017.4344F   Three liberal Justices, Justices 
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, have been keynote speakers at the American 
Constitution Society national convention; the American Constitution Society 
is a significant liberal organization.4445F  
Chief Justice Roberts is one of the five members of the United States 
Supreme Court who have connections to the Federalist Society but is the 
only one of the five who is not active in the organization.46F45  Chief Justice 
Roberts spoke at the organization’s annual meeting, 47F46 yet he does not see 
the Court as political, or at least professes not to see the Court as political, 
 
 38.  Id. at 22–23. 
 39.  Tonja Jacobi & Matthew Sag, The New Oral Argument: Justices as Advocates, 
94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1161, 1178–83 (2019). 
 40.  Id. at 1185–87. 
 41.  Id. at 1163–64, 1172. 
 42.  DEVINS & BAUM, supra note 10, at xi. 
 43.  Id. at xii.  “The Federalist Society was established in 1982 as a counterbalance 
to what its founders saw as a liberal bias in the legal academy . . . .”  Id. at 43.  Since 1982, 
“the Society has grown to become a major center of activity , a reference group, and a 
participant in the legal and policy debates on behalf of conservatives.”  Id. 
 44.  Id. at 43–44. 
 45.  Id. at xi. 
 46.  Id. 
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and has stated: “People need to know that we’re not doing politics.  We’re 
doing something different.  We’re applying the law.” 48F47  In a 2017 speech, 
Chief Justice Roberts expressed his desire that the public not perceive the 
Court as engaging in politics in deciding cases. 49F48  He saw a “real danger 
that the partisan hostility that people see in the political branches will 
affect the nonpartisan activity of the judicial branch.” 50F49 
On the other hand, Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, a prominent Democrat, 
criticized what he perceived to be the political nature of the Roberts Court: 
As a former U.S. attorney and state attorney general, I have spent my share of time in 
the courtroom before state and federal judges whose commitment to neutral 
principles and fairness made even losing parties respect their decisions.  Today, that 
confidence is undermined by the Roberts Court’s undeniable pattern of political 
allegiance.  Under Roberts, justices appointed by Republican presidents have, with 
remarkable consistency, delivered rulings that advantage big corporate and special 
interests that are, in turn, the political lifeblood of the Republican Party.  The 
“Roberts Five” are causing a crisis of credibility that is rippling through the entire 
judiciary.51F50 
One of the enduring legacies of a President are the Justices he or she 
appoints to the Court. 52F51  The nomination of a Justice is unremoved from 
the realm of politics.  A Republican President typically nominates a conservative 
 
 47.  Hefner, supra note 7. 
 48.  DEVINS & BAUM, supra note 10, at 143. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Sheldon Whitehouse, Sen. Whitehouse: There’s a ‘Crisis of Credibility’ at the 





cc/T6R2-MCP5].  He added: 
There are 79 5-4 decisions with no Democratic appointee joining the majority 
since Roberts became chief justice; and 73 of them implicate issues important to 
powerful Republican political interests.  The score in those 73 cases for the big 
Republican interests is 73-0.  On this Republican judicial romp, the Roberts Five 
have been cavalier with any doctrine, precedent or congressional finding that gets in 
their way. 
Id.  Senator Whitehouse divides the seventy-three decisions into four categories, the third 
of which is “decisions to restrict civil rights and condone discrimination, reflecting the 
worldview that corporations know best, that courts have no business remedying historical 
discrimination and that views and experiences outside the white, male, Christian mainstream of 
the Republican Party merit lower legal standing.”  Id.  He added: “The court’s so-called 
conservatives often abandon conservative judicial principles to reach the desired outcome.”  Id. 
 51.  See DEVINS & BAUM, supra note 10, at 25. 
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Justice and a Democratic President typically nominates a liberal Justice. 53F52  
President H.W. Bush nominated Clarence Thomas, a conservative-leaning 
Justice.54F53  President Clinton nominated two liberal-leaning Justices: Ginsburg 
and Breyer. 55F54  President George W. Bush nominated two conservative-
leaning Justices: Roberts and Alito. 5 6 F55  President Obama nominated two 
liberal-leaning Justices: Kagan and Sotomayor.57F56  President Trump nominated 
two conservative-leaning Justices: Gorsuch and Kavanaugh. 58F57 
Less commonly, the decisions of a Justice may depart from what the 
President who nominated the Justice was anticipating.  Two scholars opine 
that the Justices “are oriented toward individuals and groups who are part 
of the social and political elites of the country.”59F58  President Trump accused 
President George H.W. Bush of erring in nominating Justice Roberts because 
of Roberts’ vote in the 5–4 majority in 2012 to uphold the Affordable Care 
Act.60F59  President Reagan nominated Justice Kennedy, who turned out to provide 
the swing vote in many cases. 61F60  In 2005, Justice Kennedy explained his 
method of deciding a case as follows: 
But after you make a judgment you must then formulate the reason for your 
judgment into a verbal phrase, into a verbal formula.  And then you have to see 
if that makes sense, if it’s logical, if it’s fair, if it accords with the law, if it accords 
with the Constitution, if it accords with your own sense of ethics and morality.  
And, if at any point along this process you think you’re wrong, you have to go 
back and do it all over again.  And that’s, I think, not unique to the law, in that any 
prudent person behaves that way. 62F61 
Justice Kennedy is an example of a Justice who appears to ground his 
decisions in instinct rather than ideology.  But this too is not without its 
perils.  Neal Devins and Will Federspiel offer that “[w]ithout strong ideological 
pre-commitments to a particular group, Supreme Court justices are likely 
to value power and image in ways that make them resistant to forging 
a majority coalition.” 63F62  In addition, some judges want to appear above the 
political fray: “[T]he desire to appear independent may prompt some justices 
 
 52.  See id. 
 53.  Current Members, SUP. CT. U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies. 
aspx [https://perma.cc/2JTG-LS5S]. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  DEVINS & BAUM, supra note 10, at 25. 
 59.  DAVID A. KAPLAN, THE MOST DANGEROUS BRANCH: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT’S 
ASSAULT ON THE CONSTITUTION 50 (1st ed. 2018). 
 60.  See Devins & Federspiel, supra note 12, at 93. 
 61.  Lithwick, supra note 14. 
 62.  Devins & Federspiel, supra note 12, at 93. 
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to engage in a type of behavior known as reactance.” 64F63  Psychologists 
typically define reactance as a motivational reaction when someone feels 
that others are limiting that person’s choices. 65F64 
In fact, judges on the whole might be thought of as a particular breed of 
attorney; not every attorney aspires to become a judge.  “Accepting a judgeship 
entails accepting relatively significant constraints on personal activities 
and behaviors as well as a significant reduction in monetary . . . prestige 
(and an increase in potential power).” 66F65  Some theorize about what attracts 
certain attorneys to serve on the bench: “[T]he types of people who end 
up with judicial positions tend to be those who care a great deal about the 
esteem of others.”67F66  A prominent attorney usually has to sacrifice monetary 
reward when the attorney becomes a member of the judiciary.68F67  “Impression 
management figures prominently in the willingness of a Supreme Court 
Justice to join forces with others and forge a majority coalition.” 69F68 
Because of the nebulousness of this majority coalition, the tenor of the 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court evolves over time with the 
necessary changes in Court membership.  Justices new to the Court replace 
the Justices leaving the Court through death or retirement.  “The changes 
in Supreme Court preferences that can result from the arrival of new justices 
have real implications on the future meaning and authority of precedents 
set by prior courts.” 70F69  The President nominates a person to fill a vacant 
seat while keeping in mind a particular direction in which the President 
would like the Court to head. Generally speaking, that direction is usually 
synonymous with the President’s underlying political ideology. 
Prior to President Trump’s nomination of Justice Gorsuch , the Court 
comprised four conservative Justices and four liberal Justices, with Justice 
Kennedy usually the deciding vote. 7 1 F70  Justice Gorsuch’s nomination did 
not alter this balance.  However, Justice Kennedy’s retirement at the end 
of the Court’s October 2017 term gave President Trump the opportunity 
 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  See id. 
 65.  Id. at 92. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  DEVINS & BAUM, supra note 10, at 11. 
 68.  Devins & Federspiel, supra note 12, at 92. 
 69.  HANSFORD & SPRIGGS, supra note 16, at 129. 
 70.  Alicia Parlapiano & Jugal K. Patel, With Justice Kennedy’s Retirement, the Supreme 
Court Loses Its Center, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/ 
2018/06/27/us/politics/kennedy-retirement-supreme-court-median.html [https://perma.cc/ 
M9PX-GYFH]. 
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to nominate Justice Kavanaugh, a conservative.  After Justice Kavanaugh’s 
confirmation, one journalist had the following view of Chief Justice Roberts: 
“The chief justice’s yearning for conciliatory and take-it-slow decision-
making may be intensifying with the departure of Justice Anthony Kennedy 
last July and the arrival of his successor, Brett Kavanaugh, who over time 
may prove to be a more hard-line conservative than the ‘swing vote’ 
Kennedy.” 72F71  By early 2019, Chief Justice Roberts had sided with the four 
liberal Justices several times in rebuking lower courts for their failure to 
follow United States Supreme Court precedent. 73F72 
A President typically has the opportunity to nominate one or two 
Justices; however, fewer Presidents nominate Chief Justices.74F73  Chief Justice 
Roberts is the seventeenth Chief Justice in the Nation’s history. 75F74  The 
President’s choice of someone to serve as Chief Justice is crucial because 
a powerful Chief Justice, such as Chief Justice Earl Warren, can significantly 
alter the course of legal history.  Chief Justice Roberts was the youngest 
Justice on the Court at the time President George W. Bush nominated Chief 
Justice Roberts.76F75  “[H]e was known as a consummate legal mind; a virtuoso 
with a pen, lucid and wry; and at least most of the time, a thoughtful 
administrator.” 77F76 
When Chief Justice Roberts assumed his leadership role on the Court in 
2005, one of his goals was to encourage consensus building among the Justices 
resulting in more unanimous decisions. 78F77  He explained: 
I have eight extraordinarily accomplished colleagues who work hard and have a 
particular view, and they, I think, also are committed to having us work together 
as much as possible.  I think unanimous, or close to unanimous, decision is much 
more effective, much more acceptable, than a sharply divided five-four, or even 
worse, you know, four-three-two.79F78 
 
 71.  Tony Mauro, Why Roberts Sided with Liberals Blocking Restrictive Louisiana 
Abortion Law, NAT’L L.J. (Feb. 8, 2019, 12:19 PM), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/ 
2019/02/08/why-roberts-sided-with-liberals-blocking-restrictive-louisiana-abortion-law/ 
[https://perma.cc/FWB4-A9TC]. 
 72.  Tony Mauro, Chief Justice Roberts Joins Liberal Wing to Snub Alabama Court 
in Death Case, NAT’L L.J. (Feb. 27, 2019, 2:52 PM), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/ 
2019/02/27/chief-justice-roberts-joins-liberal-wing-to-snub-alabama-court-in-death-case/ 
[https://perma.cc/U43Z-DAYT]. 
 73.  See Supreme Court Nominations (Present-1789), U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate. 
gov/legislative/nominations/SupremeCourtNominations1789present.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
AJ42-DSH9]. 
 74.  Supreme Court of the United States: Chief Justices, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www. 
fjc.gov/history/courts/supreme-court-united-states-chief-justices [https://perma.cc/LS2E-
8P68]. 
 75.  KAPLAN, supra note 59, at 99. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  See WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 24, at 93–94. 
 78.  Mauro, supra note 71. 
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In that role, he has taken a “minimalist approach,” which has resulted in a 
greater percentage of unanimous decisions. 80F79  When Chief Justice Roberts 
was questioned “whether he was making progress in his goal of reducing 
the number of 5-4 decisions, Roberts said, ‘Well, you know, some days 
are better than others.’” 81F80 
B.  Deciding Cases 
For the Supreme Court, the judicial decision-making process begins long 
before a case is heard on its merits.  Justices are largely in control of choosing 
which cases to hear; the jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court is 
largely discretionary.  Through accepting or declining to accept a petition 
for writ of certiorari, the Justices select which cases the Court will hear 
and decide.82F81  The Justices’ votes on whether to grant or deny a petition for 
writ of certiorari can be strategic.  The crucial tipping point is when there 
are three votes to grant the petition and a single Justice wavering on the 
decision.  The final decision of the holdout Justice could be made in favor 
of granting the petition, if the Justice wants the Court to reverse the lower 
court decision.  In contrast, a Justice could vote against granting the petition 
if the Justice is afraid that granting the petition might mean that the Court 
would ultimately decide to reverse a lower court decision with which 
the Justice agrees. 83F82 
The Court decides a relatively small number of cases in full opinion each 
year.  The cases initially filed with the Court undergo a very discriminating 
selection process: one study showed that the Court hears less than 75 cases 
of the 7,000 to 8,000 petitions filed during an October through June Court 
term.84F83  The Justices’ law clerks are the first ones to review the filed cases 
and write memos suggesting whether the Court should grant certiorari on 
the filed cases. 85F84  The law clerks typically graduated from prestigious law 
 
 79.  WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 24, at 24. 
 80.  Mauro, supra note 71. 
 81.  Supreme Court Procedures, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal- 
courts/educational-resources/about-educational-outreach/activity-resources/supreme-1 
[https://perma.cc/GB4X-Y8QM]. 
 82.  HUME, supra note 23, at 116. 
 83.  Jacobi & Sag, supra note 39, at 1198.  That number of cases heard has remained 
fairly constant since 2010; between 1960 and 1990, the number of cases heard dropped from 
approximately 175 to 100 and the drop continued, although less precipitously, until 2010.  
Id. at 1197. 
 84.  Supreme Court Procedures, supra note 81. 
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schools and previously clerked for federal intermediate court judges; by 
tradition, each of the Associate Justices hires four law clerks and the Chief 
Justice hires four or five.86F85  Several of the present Justices clerked for Supreme 
Court Justices, with Chief Justice Roberts clerking for Justice William H. 
Rehnquist, Justice Kagan clerking for Justice Thurgood Marshall, Justice 
Gorsuch clerking for then-retired Justice Byron R. White and Justice Anthony 
M. Kennedy, and Justice Kavanaugh clerking for Justice Kennedy. 87F86 
Although a Justice’s law clerks split the workload, the time requirement 
necessary to review the petitions is intense.  The Court established the “cert 
pool” tradition in 1973 to ease the law clerks’ workload.88F87  A pool law clerk 
writes a memo circulated to the chambers of the Justices participating 
in the pool; the memo makes a recommendation whether the Court should 
grant a petition for writ of certiorari. 89F88  The easier path to follow for a pool 
law clerk is to recommend that the Court not grant a petition; an outlier 
recommendation would be to grant a petition, as there are few petitions 
granted among the thousands of petitions filed with the Court each year.  
Retired Justice John Paul Stevens speculated that the use of the cert pool 
contributed to the decreasing number of petitions granted by the Court. 90F89  
Justice Kavanaugh experienced writing pool memos while clerking at the 
Court and commentators view Justice Kavanaugh’s decision to join the 
cert pool as him carrying out his promise to be a team player. 91F90  Only two 
Justices, Alito and Gorsuch, opted out of the Court’s cert pool.9192F   The decision 
of Justices Alito and Gorsuch not to be part of the cert pool means that those 
Justices and their clerks must review the petitions for writ of certiorari 
themselves.9293F   A law clerk writing for a single Justice can be more candid 
than one writing a pool memo.9394F   Some contend that the cert pool puts too 
heavy an emphasis on the opinion of a single law clerk.9495F   The law clerk 
memo recommendation does carry a lot of weight, although the Justices say 
that they personally review the petitions.9596F   One empirical study concludes 
that the Court grants certiorari in those cases likely to affect lower court 
decisions: “[T]he Court grants cert to the case that will most significantly 
 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Current Members, supra note 53. 
 87.  Tony Mauro, Unlike Gorsuch, Kavanaugh Jumps into SCOTUS Cert Pool, 
NAT’L L.J. (Oct. 11, 2018, 2:07 PM), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2018/10/11/ 
unlike-gorsuch-kavanaugh-jumps-into-scotus-cert-pool/ [https://perma.cc/V47A-4ZSV]. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. 
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shape future lower court case outcomes in the direction that the Court 
prefers.” 97F96 
The Chief Justice plays a vital role in the decision-making process because 
the Chief Justice is the one who chairs the judicial conference; in that role, 
the Chief Justice summarizes the case and is the one who first voices an 
opinion on how the Court should decide a case. 98F97  If in the majority, the 
Chief Justice is the one who determines which Justice will author the majority 
opinion.99F98  The Chief Justice also chairs (1) conferences in which the Justices 
decide which petitions for writ of certiorari the Court will grant, (2) oral 
arguments, and (3) post oral argument conferences in which the Justices discuss 
how to decide cases.99100F   The ability to steer the Court in conferences and oral 
argument potentially provides the Chief Justice a power not shared by the 
Associate Justices.100101F   Chief Justice Roberts, however, apparently sees 
himself as having only a modest role in Court deliberations: “I do think it’s a 
worthy objective—not at all costs, I mean—if you have strongly held views 
on a particular approach to a case, and that results in a five to four decision, 
well, that’s the way it is.  But I do think it’s worth trying to get broader views.”101102F  
At the post oral argument conference, the most senior Justice in the 
majority assigns one of the Justices to write the majority opinion.103F102  Scholars 
note the importance of assigning a majority opinion to a Justice: 
The author of the initial opinion draft can significantly affect the policy the Court 
produces because the opinion writer’s first draft establishes the initial  
position over which the justices bargain.  Depending on the writer’s preference, 
the first draft can be crafted broadly or narrowly, can ignore or apply precedents, 
and can fashion various kinds of policy.  Moreover, the opinion writer is in a position 
to accept or reject bargaining offers from his or her colleagues. 104F103 
 
 96.  Álvaro Bustos & Tonja Jacobi, Judicial Choice Among Cases for Certiorari 1 
(Dec. 16, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2886398 [https://perma.cc/SXL9-FXGW]. 
 97.  CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32821, THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES: 
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE OFFICE AND PROCESS FOR APPOINTMENT 4 (2005). 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Supreme Court Procedures, supra note 81. 
 100.  WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 13, at 200. 
 101.  Mauro, supra note 71. 
 102.  Supreme Court Procedures, supra note 81. 
 103.  WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 13, at 81 (quoting LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE 
CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 126 (1998)). 
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Typically, the Chief Justice assigns to himself the task of authoring the 
majority opinion in difficult cases, which are often the cases interpreting 
the Constitution. 105F104 
The number and type of judicial opinions pronounced by the Court often 
offer insight.  Some 200 years ago, Chief Justice John Marshall instituted 
a policy of the Court issuing one opinion. 106F105  Previously, each Justice had 
issued his own opinion, which made it difficult to determine the exact nature 
of the Court ruling in a case.106  As time went on, the Court gradually fell from 107F
the tradition of issuing a single opinion, with some Justices writing concurring 
opinions and some writing dissenting opinions.  Recently, the percentage 
of nonunanimous opinions has climbed to 50%–60%.107108F   The appearance 
of a higher percentage of non-unanimous decisions may have the effect 
of making the Court seem “more fragmented, less stable, and less 
predictable.”108109F  
Chief Justice John Marshall also began the tradition of the Chief Justice 
writing the majority opinion in important constitutional cases; this tradition 
has continued unabated.110F109  The majority opinion may, however, evolve over 
time as the author revises the opinion to incorporate language suggested 
by various Justices such that the final majority opinion has become a 
collaborative effort of a number of Justices. 111F110  The “report vote” is the 
agreement of at least a majority of the Justices with the finalized majority 
opinion.112F111  Other Justices may prepare dissenting opinions and those in the 
majority may prepare concurring opinions.113F112  The initial draft of the majority 
opinion is subject to being revised any number of times based on the reaction 
of the other Justices. 114F113  The other Justices have a great deal of bargaining 
power because they can threaten to write concurring and dissenting opinions 
if they decide that the majority opinion does not contain language sufficient 
to address their viewpoints.115F114  The decision to write a concurring or a dissenting 
opinion requires a Justice to commit time to author the opinion—sometimes 
a significant amount of time, if a long opinion is required. 116F115  As a result, 
a Justice may find difficulty in carving out the requisite time needed, especially 
 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  M. Todd Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A Theory 
of Dissent, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 283, 313. 
 106.  See id. at 284. 
 107.  WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 24, at 101. 
 108.  Id. at 102. 
 109.  WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 13, at 81. 
 110.  Id. at 105. 
 111.  Id. at 83. 
 112.  Supreme Court Procedures, supra note 81. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. 
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if the final decision in a case comes at the end of the Court term when time is 
at a premium. 
Other than appearing together during oral argument and engaging in 
discussion during their conferences, the Justices may have little personal 
interaction with each other, and commentators have described the atmosphere 
at the Court as similar to nine separate law firms rather than a single law 
firm with nine partners. 117F116  Chief Justice Roberts is attempting to combat 
this fragmentation by creating a more cohesive atmosphere for the Court, 
believing that the Court is “most effective when we operate and function 
as a court rather than nine separate individuals.” 118F117 
Court observers perceive the Office of the Solicitor General to be 
influential in decisions reached by the United States Supreme Court, with 
the Court more often siding with the office, whether the office appears 
before the Court as an advocate or as amicus curiae.  One author theorizes 
that the influence of the Office of the Solicitor General differs depending 
on whether a case is ideological or nonideological: “in ideological cases 
the justices are less susceptible to persuasion from the Office of the Solicitor 
General, despite the high regard with which these attorneys are held, because 
their minds have been made up.”118119F   Extremely experienced attorneys who 
regularly appear before the United States Supreme Court staff the Solicitor 
General’s Office.119120F   “The solicitor general’s office participates in approximately 
two-thirds of the cases that the Supreme Court decides on the merits each 
year, and it wins most of them.”120121F   Some attribute this success to the high 
level of familiarity and experience the Solicitor General’s office has with 
appearing before the Court, while others attribute this success to the high 
level of advocacy of the office and the long-term relationship between the 
Court and the office.121122F  
Court observers scrutinize the activities of the Justices “to a degree that 
is unusual and almost certainly unique among courts in the United States.”123F122  
Legal analysts ramp up this scrutiny as the Court nears the end of its term 
in June when the Court announces a majority of its decisions.124F123  Typically, 
 
 116.  WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 13, at 86. 
 117.  WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 24, at 148. 
 118.  Wrightsman, supra note 26, at 65. 
 119.  HUME, supra note 23, at 185. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  DEVINS & BAUM, supra note 10, at 23. 
 123.  See id. at 29. 
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the Court announces some of its most important and difficult decisions 
near the end of June; these are often decisions on cases in which the Court 
heard oral argument months earlier.125F124  Many times, the Court disposes of its 
most difficult cases by reversing lower court decisions.  Each year the Court 
accepts a petition for writ of certiorari in only a small percentage of the 
approximately 8,000 cases petitioned to the Court. 126F125  Although one reason 
for the Court granting a petition is to settle a split among the circuits, another 
reason may be to overturn a lower court decision. 
Other indicators of the ultimate decision of the Court that academics 
have studied is the pattern in which the Justices ask questions during oral 
argument127F126 and how the Justices use humor during oral argument.128F127  With 
respect to questions, some claim that there is more questioning in oral 
argument of the attorney representing the losing party in the case—a claim 
that is backed up with empirical support. 129F128  Within the last thirty years, 
“‘the disagreement gap’—the difference between the number of words a 
Justice speaks to the Petitioner versus the Respondent in a given case—became 
a much more reliable predictor of voting behavior on the Court.”129130F   One 
scholar opines that the Justices’ patterns of questioning during oral argument 
is more closely tied to the Justices’ preliminary votes in conference following 
oral argument than it is to the Justices’ alignment in the Court’s opinion 
when ultimately announced.130131F  
When it comes to humor, the law professors Tonja Jacobi and Matthew 
Sag assert that “[h]umor is a weapon of advocacy, and it is a particularly 
powerful one because the advocates are unarmed against it—not only by 
their formally inferior status to the Justices, but also because the rules of 
the Court admonish them to avoid using humor themselves.” 132F131  In an 
empirical study of Court humor from the 1955 Court term through the 
2017 Court term, Jacobi and Sag found “that the justices most often use 
courtroom humor when they will eventually vote against the side the advocate 
is representing, when an advocate is losing an argument, and when an advocate 
 
 124.  Supreme Court Procedures, supra note 81. 
 125.  E.g., The Supreme Court 2016 Term: The Statistics, 131 HARV. L. REV. 403, 410 
tbl.II (2017). 
 126.  WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 24, at 46; Jacobi & Sag, supra note 39, at 1162. 
 127.  See Tonja Jacobi & Matthew Sag, Taking Laughter Seriously at the Supreme 
Court, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1423, 1429 (2019). 
 128.  WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 24, at 48–49. 
 129.  Jacobi & Sag, supra note 127, at 1429. 
 130.  See WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 24, at 63. 
 131.  Jacobi & Sag, supra note 127, at 1429. 
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is inexperienced.” 133F132  They concluded that “the justices use humor as a 
tool of rhetoric and advocacy and an expression of power and dominance.”134F133 
Some theorize on the importance of the number of amicus curiae briefs 
supporting the opposing parties in a case as well as the interest groups 
expressing support for particular parties in impacting the ultimate decisions 
that the Justices make. 135F134  Professors who author amicus briefs may have 
an edge, as a survey of the Justices’ law clerks showed that 88% of the clerks 
gave “closer attention” to amicus briefs submitted by professors at elite law 
schools. 136F135 
Justices have a number of options in the type of opinions they may offer.  
A unanimous decision is the best indicator of the Court being in consensus, 
particularly when it is unaccompanied by any concurring opinions.  Justices 
may be more willing to join in a majority opinion if that opinion is narrow; 
a narrowly drafted opinion serves as precedent in fewer future cases.  As 
a result, this approach results in more unanimous decisions.  This minimalist 
approach results in the Court sidestepping difficult constitutional questions 
and has the disadvantage of not answering important questions that observers 
anticipated that the Court would answer.137F136  One scholar compared unanimous 
versus nonunanimous Court decisions and found that “unanimous decisions, 
as expected, were lower in complexity than nonunanimous decisions.” 138F137 
A Justice might concur in the majority decision, yet write a separate 
concurring opinion, or a Justice might concur with the majority judgment 
but not in the majority opinion.  The appearance of a concurring opinion 
indicates that the author is not entirely in consensus with the majority of 
the Court.  Obviously, a dissenting opinion indicates an explicit disagreement 
with the majority and multiple dissenting opinions reflects an even greater 
fracture among the Justices.  As one scholar notes, “it’s the divisive cases 
that typically matter most.” 139F138  A Justice may choose to write a dissenting 
opinion to show the Justice’s independence, to attack the reasoning of the 
majority opinion, to give voice to the Justice’s views on the case, or to express 
the theory upon which the Justice believes the Court should decide a similar 
case. 
 
 132.  Id. at 1430. 
 133.  Id. at 1495. 
 134.  DEVINS & BAUM, supra note 10, at 48. 
 135.  Id. at 46. 
 136.  See WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 24, at 26. 
 137.  WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 13, at 106. 
 138.  KAPLAN, supra note 59, at 18. 
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Concurring and dissenting opinions tend to weaken the impact of the 
majority opinion. 140F139  Understanding this, Chief Justice Roberts “has been 
advocating for more narrow, unanimous decisions.”141F140  Dissenting opinions 
are more likely in important cases in which the dissenting Justice feels that 
the Justice needs to voice his or her views.142F141  A case that centers on a tension 
between a fundamental individual constitutional right and protection of 
society may produce a number of opinions and the number of opinions may 
grow if the legal basis for the decision is subject to varying interpretation.143F142  
In addition, a dissent can “expose holes in the thinking of the majority, they 
strengthen the conviction of those who disagree, and they further widen 
debate.”144F143 
The Court may issue more closely split decisions with only five Justices 
joining in the majority opinion in the more difficult cases concerning the 
tough ideological issues.145F144  “Decisions and dissents in some cases lay bare 
the differing values and attitudes of justices.” 146F145  Some think that reaching 
a decision in an ideological case is more time consuming, as gauged by 
the length of time between oral argument and the date on which the Court 
announces a decision. 147F146  Prior to Justice Kennedy’s retirement from the 
Court at the end of the October 2017 term, Justice Kennedy often provided 
the pivotal vote in close decisions of the Court.148F147  Justice Kennedy’s position 
on these close, narrowly decided cases was not consistently in the liberal nor 
in the conservative camps, which some observers see as reflecting an open- 
mindedness; others claim Justice Kennedy was indecisive and, therefore, 
could easily be persuaded. 149F148 
Some commentators see the Court as losing some of its legitimacy when 
it reaches a case by the majority opinion collecting only five votes.150F149  Others 
view such a fractured decision as inevitable in a hard-fought, contentious 
case. 151F150  “1. Social actors, including the justices, make choices to achieve 
certain goals.  2. Social actors, including justices, act strategically in that 
their choices depend upon what they expect the other actors to do.  3. These 
choices are constrained by an institutional setting in which they are made.”152F151  
 
 139.  WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 13, at 100. 
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 144.  See WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 24, at 94. 
 145.  WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 13, at 123. 
 146.  Wrightsman, supra note 26, at 66. 
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Deciding a case before the United States Supreme Court requires a significant 
amount of interaction among the Justices.  The Justice assigned to write the 
majority opinion might search for consensus by wording the opinion to garner 
the requisite number of votes to maintain a majority.  In that way, the author 
of the opinion must be cognizant of the known views of other Justices to 
incorporate those views into the opinion and may be hoping to persuade 
some initially in the minority to join the majority.  There is often a give-
and-take among the Justices, with an effective legal argument potentially 
persuading a Justice to switch sides.  Many of the most difficult cases before 
the Court have been decided on a 5–4 vote.152153F   The language of an opinion may 
have the effect of causing a Justice to switch sides.  Some Justices may be 
more skillful and effective in shaping the content of a particular opinion.  
Considering that it is a lifetime appointment to the United States Supreme 
Court and Justices may work together for years, a spirit of cooperation may 
be useful in reaching consensus. 
A United States Supreme Court decision settles the controversy between 
the parties to the case, but perhaps more importantly, the decision predicts 
how the Court will decide future cases and governs the activity of lower 
courts.  Because the Court issues such a small number of opinions each 
year, the legal community carefully scrutinizes the wording of Court cases 
to determine how courts will apply the case in the future.  Although 
the judgment in a case is obviously important to the parties to the case, 
the rationale for the decision may be much more crucial to certain Justices.  
The author of the majority opinion could influence a Justice to join in the 
majority opinion; in the alternative, the Justice could decide to join in only 
the judgment but not in the reasoning and write a separate concurring opinion 
because of a divergence from the reasoning of the majority opinion. 153154F   
Certain decisions may be the product of bargaining among the Justices.  More 
Justices joining in the majority may be the result of more effective bargaining 
by the author of the majority opinion, while more concurring and dissenting 
opinions could be the product of bargaining that did not proceed so  
successfully.154155F  
The doctrine of stare decisis, which we will discuss in detail shortly, is 
perhaps the most oft-cited constraint on decision-making, but, as we have 
already discussed, it is certainly not the only one.  A judge on an appellate 
 
 152.  See WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 24, at 87. 
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 154.  See id. at 112–13. 
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court is constrained by the presence of the other judges who participate in 
deciding the case.  On the United States Supreme Court, a Justice has to 
consider the viewpoints of the other Justices.  The Justices work in a rarified 
atmosphere: “[T]he Justices are very much part of a network of super-elite 
lawyers that includes former Supreme Court clerks, the Office of the Solicitor 
General, and the Supreme Court bar, that is, private sector lawyers who 
regularly practice before the Supreme Court.” 156F155  The Justices among them 
bring a wealth of legal knowledge and different Justices might want to follow 
disparate doctrines as controlling on a case.  A benefit of multiple viewpoints 
and the discussion among the Justices is that an opinion might be better reasoned 
than an opinion reached by fewer participants.  To garner sufficient votes for 
a majority opinion, the author must take into account the differing viewpoints.  
Any concurrences and dissents can be useful in identifying any weaknesses 
in the reasoning employed in the majority decision.  In addition, the Justices 
consider that each Court decision will be subject to scrutiny by other judges, 
attorneys, the press, interest groups, and the public.  The high visibility of 
the Court provides another constraint on the wording of the decision. 
In sum, while a Justice’s legal and political ideologies may be primary 
drivers of their ultimate position in a given case, these are not unchecked 
influences.  The need to negotiate with—and recruit—other Justices in 
pursuit of a majority vote provides one check, as does the need to project 
stability and retain the public’s confidence.  As Benjamin Cardozo once 
observed, “Justice is not to be taken by storm.  She is to be wooed by slow 
advances.”157F156  But perhaps the biggest constraint on ideological activism 
is rooted in the effect of precedent. 
C.  The Effect of Precedent 
The Court has to justify and support its decision through written opinion.  
Judge Kozinski stated, “Under our law judges do in fact have considerable 
discretion in certain of their decisions: [including] interpreting language 
in the Constitution . . . . The larger reality, however, is that judges exercise their 
powers subject to very significant constraints.”158F157  Judges “may choose relevant 
analogies (or precedents) as better or worse, applicable or inapplicable, 
not because of any particular desired outcome but rather because of their 
own preexisting knowledge.” 159F158  Commentators immediately analyze new 
Court decisions; the author of an opinion must provide sufficient reasoning 
 
 155.  DEVINS & BAUM, supra note 10, at 25. 
 156.  BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 133 (1924). 
 157.  Robbennolt, MacCoun & Darley, supra note 9, at 27. 
 158.  Barbara A. Spellman, Judges, Expertise, and Analogy, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
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to bolster the Court’s legitimacy.  “[J]udges may, in fact, be following the 
idealized decision-making process to the letter, and be unmotivated toward 
finding a particular result, yet may usually still reach the predicted result.”160F159 
In other words, the result in a case may coincide with a judge’s principles, 
yet the judge may not have consciously manipulated the wording in the 
decision to reach the desired result.  “Understanding precedent requires 
recognizing that we can break with some particular precedents, but we 
cannot break away from precedent.” 161F160  Although the Court is deciding 
the particular case before the Court, the Justices are well aware that the 
principles set forth in the case apply to other cases with similar facts.  “To 
avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they 
should be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define 
and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before them . . . .”161  162F
To be persuasive, an opinion must be consistent with current society in 
which technology plays a central role—as we will discuss shortly.  “Nor 
can these expressions [of the principles of constitutional law] be fully understood 
apart from the cultural, political, social, legal, and historical contexts in which 
they are made or subsequently evaluated.”162163F   An opinion must also provide 
predictability to guide courts in future decisions. 
Court precedents vary in the weight of authority accorded them, with some 
accorded more weight than others; for example, some decisions of Chief 
Justice John Marshall are considered super precedents that will continue 
to contain foundational principles for the United States government.  “Because 
the Court is a critical interpreter of (and actor) in historical events, its 
precedents preserve, illuminate, and reflect contemporary perspectives on 
the nation’s social, political, and legal traditions.” 164F163 
Scholars have recognized “the interactive effect between the precedent 
vitality and the ideological distance between the precedent and the Court.”165F164  
The Court has the option of overruling precedent, but the Court exercises 
caution in taking this step.  “[A]ll the current justices, as well as the vast 
majority in American history, place a premium not just on correctly deciding 
 
 159.  Id. 
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questions, but on the institutional value of stability—avoiding needless chaos, 
uncertainty, and instability—in constitutional law.” 166F165 
Overruling precedent is problematic in that, if not carefully done, the 
Court can weaken its legitimacy; following precedent lends stability to the 
law and increases the Court’s legitimacy.  “As ideological distance increases, 
the hazard or likelihood of a precedent being overruled also increases.  But 
this effect is conditioned by the extent to which the precedent is vital.” 167F166  
Some may say that the Court is engaging in judicial activism when it 
overrules a prior decision of the Court. 168F167  In other words, the Court does 
not take the decision to overrule precedent lightly.  “Standards abound in 
constitutional law . . . includ[ing] the balancing tests the Court employs for 
determining the reasonableness of searches or seizures.” 169F168  The Court can 
cast an outmoded Court doctrine aside.  “The easiest way to overrule a decision 
is by persuading the Court to change its mind rather than amending the 
Constitution.” 170F169 
Following the doctrine of stare decisis in deciding a case provides 
guidance for a judge and has the added benefit of constraining the judge.  
“[O]verrul[ing] too many precedents not only sets a bad example—a bad 
precedent—because it provides no incentive to respect the work of its 
predecessors, but also invites other branches and lower courts to view its 
decisions with the same lack of respect with which it views previous 
decisions.” 171F170  This constraint makes the final decision in the case more 
palatable both for the parties in the case and for judges, attorneys, and the 
public who consider the case as precedent to decide future cases that have 
substantially similar facts. “[C]ourt decisions are not self-executing and 
thus third parties must implement them before they have any real effect.  
Since legitimacy encourages compliance, it enhances the power of courts 
and facilitates their ability to cause legal and political change.”171172F   Precedent- 
setting cases operate as rules that are set against the backdrop of generally 
accepted legal principles that provide a framework for the legal structure 
of the country’s government.  “A healthy respect for precedent means learning 
to live with decisions with which one disagrees.”172173F  
The doctrine of stare decisis lends stability and predictability to the country’s 
legal system.  “[Chief Justice] Roberts acknowledged that predictability, 
stability, consistency, and reliance are values to be taken into account in 
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constitutional adjudication, and it would seem to follow that these values 
ought to count in most cases.” 174F173  Thus, the fabric of society has endorsed 
precedent-setting cases, which serve to guide judges in their future decisions.  
“It follows that there may be at least some instances in which the values 
promoted by fidelity to precedent are compelling.” 175F174  The country’s legal 
system is an adversarial one in which the judge determines the distribution 
of rights between the parties litigating.  The judge’s reasoning justifies 
this distribution and legitimizes the decision to the public.  A judge writes 
an opinion to make the decision appear to be objective, with the judge 
constrained by prior case law.  However, where opposing attorneys can make 
reasoned arguments in favor of their clients, it is clear that the judge’s 
decision is not as constrained as the judge’s reasoning would make it seem.  
“Much of the literature asserts (at least implicitly) that precedent acts either 
as a constraint that operates across the board or as a ‘cloak’ that never actually 
influences the Court.”175176F   The wording of the Court opinion may be more 
important than the judgment in a case because the reasoning is what sets 
forth the legal rule to be followed in future cases.  The legal community 
scrutinizes each word of a Court opinion to glean insight into the direction 
that the Court may be heading in future cases. 
Still, judges and legal scholars differ as to the appropriate weight that 
precedent should be given.  Lord Denning, who some view as one of the 
greatest of British judges from the past century, stated: 
My root belief is that the proper role of a judge is to do justice between the parties 
before him.  If there is any rule of law [that] impairs the doing of justice, then it 
is the province of the judge to do all he legitimately can to avoid that rule—or 
even to change it—so as to do justice in the instant case before him. 177F176 
This nearly combative view has been circumvented by others who simply 
expand their view of precedent.  Michael Gerhardt, for example, defines 
precedent as “any past constitutional opinions, decisions, or events which 
the Supreme Court . . . invest[s] with normative authority.” 178F177  This means 
that precedent is not limited to the Court’s prior decisions and may include 
“norms (such as avoiding ruling on constitutional issues whenever possible) . . . 
and traditions (such as producing opinions for the Court and not seriatim) 
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that the justices have deliberately chosen to follow.” 179F178  Precedent has an 
immense effect and its golden rule is that “justices must be prepared to 
treat others’ precedents as they would like their own to be treated or risk 
their preferred precedents being treated with the same kind of disdain they 
show others.’” 180F179 
For his part, Chief Justice Roberts expressed the following concerning 
precedent during his confirmation hearing before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee: 
Judges and justices are servants of the law, not the other way around.  Judges are 
like umpires.  Umpires don’t make the rules; they apply them.  The role of an 
umpire and a judge is critical.  They make sure everybody plays by the rules.  
But it is a limited role.  Nobody ever went to the ball game to see the umpire.  
Judges have to have the humility to recognize that they operate within a system 
of precedent, shaped by other judges equally striving to live up to the judicial 
oath.181F180 
During his confirmation hearing, “John Roberts avoided controversy by 
rejecting fidelity to any particular theory of constitutional interpretation.  
Instead, he espoused a philosophy of ‘judicial modesty.’  He likened judging 
to umpiring, and he referred to himself as a proponent of ‘bottom-up’ judging, 
which included a healthy degree of respect for stare decisis.”182F181  In a similar 
vein, Justice Kavanaugh stated that he would be “hardworking, even-keeled, 
open-minded, independent and dedicated to the Constitution.”183F182  At his 
swearing in ceremony, Justice Kavanaugh stated that “a good judge must 
be an umpire, a neutral and impartial arbitrator.”184F183  Before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee Justice Kavanaugh explained, “I don’t decide cases based on 
personal or policy preferences.” 185F184 
Harvard Law Professor Cass Sunstein advocates minimalism in judicial 
writing, meaning that the decision should be fairly narrow, rather than broad.186F185  
“Minimalism has the principal virtue of reducing judicial interference as 
much as possible with democratic authorities’ own, independent constitutional 
judgments.” 187F186  A benefit of writing a narrow decision is that more Justices 
might be inclined to join in the decision than if the decision were broader.  
“Cass Sunstein’s theory of judicial minimalism suggests, for example, the 
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Court should generally undertheorize, which means leaving some things 
undecided.  He proposes some decisions should be narrow (confined to 
their particular facts) and shallow (reasoned thinly), while others should 
be narrow and deep (more narrowly reasoned).” 188F187  Chief Justice Roberts 
is a fan of the minimalist approach to writing opinions. 189F188  Both Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito assert that they are “genuinely committed to 
judicial modesty or constitutional humility”;189 in other words, they are 
“pro-precedent.”191F190  These terms indicate that the two jurists respect precedent 
and are minimalists in that their chosen path is to reach narrow decisions 
that do as little damage as possible to earlier Court decisions.  Justice Scalia 
was and Justice Thomas is at the opposite extreme of the spectrum in being 
more likely to question the wisdom of adhering to an earlier Court case as 
precedent.192F191  Notwithstanding, the Justices on today’s Court “appear to value 
precedent more than justices have in the past.” 193F192 
Following the doctrine of stare decisis gives the law stability and predictability, 
which enhance Court legitimacy.  However, the law is bound to change 
as social practices and technology move society in new directions.  “[T]he 
values of precedents increase the more often they are cited.  Conversely, 
the values of precedents decrease the less often they are cited—or more 
often they are criticized.” 194F193  A precedent may become so outmoded and 
inconsistent with contemporary practices that the Court must overrule the case 
either in whole or in part.  “[D]istinguishing, narrowing, and occasionally 
overruling precedent are acts which the Constitution authorizes.”195F194  Explicit 
overruling of constitutional precedent in the area of Fourth Amendment 
search and seizure is the fourth most prevalent area for overrule, following 
due process, the commerce clause, and the Fifth Amendment. 196F195  “An 
implicitly overruled precedent no longer is law, even as applied to the fact 
situation it initially purported to resolve, while a seriously narrowed precedent 
retains sufficient vitality to resolve fact situations identical to that which 
it originally settled.” 197F196 
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Explicit overruling of precedent occurs more frequently when there has 
been a change in the Court’s membership since the Court decided the precedent- 
setting case.198F197  “Legal scholars increasingly suggest that the Court is much 
more of a follower than a leader with respect to constitutional change.” 199F198  
Predictably, then, the most far-ranging discussions of earlier cases decided by 
the Court in a Court opinion tend to be those in which the Court is “either 
expressly or clearly reconsidering prior decisions.” 200F199  Textualists, like 
Justices Scalia and Thomas, advocate that the Court remain faithful to 
the Constitution as written and as the Founding Fathers would have 
interpreted the Constitution when the country adopted it.  However, skeptics 
warn that “[t]he Framers and Ratifiers failed to anticipate every contingency, 
they often failed to reach consensus on more specific language, and they 
agreed on general terms for different, often complex reasons.” 201F200  Other 
Justices recognize that the Court must interpret the Constitution in light of 
evolving social practices and technology: “The abstractness of a written 
constitution limits its ability to guide concrete decisions taken in its name, 
and increases the likelihood of unpredictability in its construction.”201202F   The 
legal model of following precedent in decision-making “assumes that the 
intent of the framers is clear and discernible.  Not all judges agree.  Each 
article of the Constitution is remarkably succinct.”202203F  
While a Justice’s particular take on precedent is informative, a singular focus 
on any one method that controls how a judge decides a case would be 
misplaced.  “The legal model relies on precedents.  But the decision whether 
a given precedent [applies] is a subjective one.” 204F203  Lawrence Wrightsman 
notes that this subjectivity may ultimately come down to how a judge reacts 
to the legal briefs that they are presented with: 
[A] judicial opinion, the written statement of a judge’s decision on the disposition 
of a case, may be partially based on that judge’s attitude—his or her evaluative 
reaction to a stimulus object (legal briefs, in this context).  In written form, the 
judicial opinion becomes the behavioral component of the attitude. 205F204 
A judge’s particular attitude may conflict with the interests of others involved 
in the case, including the litigants, other judges on the court, special interests, 
and so on.  It does not really matter whether the interest is collegial, legal, 
or ideological, and some observers argue that, compared other judges, “Supreme 
 
 197.  Id. at 11. 
 198.  Id. at 107. 
 199.  Id. at 4. 
 200.  Id. at 95. 
 201.  Id. 
 202.  WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 13, at 114–15. 
 203.  Id. at 120. 
 204.  Id. at 121. 
BAST_PATRICK (DO NOT DELETE) 6/1/2020  3:46 PM 
[VOL. 57:  357, 2020]  Information Otherwise Unknowable 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 383 
Court justices have greater discretion to base their decisions on their values 
or on public policy goals.” 206F205 
III.  PSYCHOLOGY AND THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
A.  The Psychology of the Ideology-Precedent Spectrum 
One thing that a Justice’s ideology and the Justice’s view of precedent 
have in common is that these influences are often explicit.  A Justice’s 
track record in politically divisive cases provides a fairly straightforward 
snapshot of the Justice’s ideological stance.  Likewise, a Justice’s written 
opinion can provide evidence of the Justice’s stance on precedent.  These 
important predictors of judicial decision-making are often either observable 
or deducible.  Somewhat less obvious are the myriad influences on a judge’s 
decision-making that might be categorized as psychological. 
The discipline of psychology may shed some light on what motivates 
judges in deciding cases by helping to identify the factors involved in judicial 
decision-making that are not so easily captured by written opinions.  In 
particular, it can help to illuminate how Justices navigate the tension that 
sometimes arises between ideology and precedent in deciding cases.  As 
this Article has discussed, scholars have developed various models that 
they use in predicting United States Supreme Court decision-making: “At 
one end of the spectrum are those who herald the importance of stare decisis 
as perhaps the single most important factor in judicial decisions.”207F206  However, 
some judges may cite precedent as a subterfuge for achieving a result that 
lines up with their ideology.  “At the other end of the spectrum are those who 
argue that precedent is not influential, that it merely cloaks the justices’ 
personal policy preferences.”208F207  At times, judges write opinions with a mixture 
of motives.  Finally, there are also “those who argue that precedent can  
occasionally influence the justices but also believe that nonlegal factors 
can be just as important.” 209F208 
Justices are, after all, human beings and “even in their court decisions, they 
reflect many human qualities. . . . [J]ustices are predictable only within 
limits.  Legal philosophies and personal attitudes go only so far in predicting.  
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Situational determinants may intrude.” 210F209  Wrightsman argues that a 
“sophisticated understanding of judicial decision making should explicitly 
incorporate the notion that judges simultaneously attempt to further numerous, 
disparate, and often conflicting, objectives.” 211F210 
Even if guided by a particular policy choice, Justices typically bolster the 
reasoning and the judgment in a case by citing to precedent-setting cases to 
legitimize the opinion.  “The most widely shared assumption is that judges as 
decision makers act primarily or entirely on the goal of making good legal 
policy.”212F211  Some believe that judges engage in second-order reasoning when 
deciding cases. 213F212  Second-order reasoning is involved when a judge feels 
guided by a requirement of following higher order rules, such as precedent 
in interpreting the United States Constitution, when the judge otherwise 
would be guided by other factors. 214F213  “Second-order reasoning is deemed 
central to the judicial function in that it forces judges to abide by a hierarchy 
of reasons, and specifically, to yield to higher order considerations even when 
they feel that doing so leads to suboptimal or unwise outcomes for the case 
at hand.” 215F214 
The legal model posits that judges follow precedent and legal principle 
because following precedent lends stability to the law. 216F215  A judge whose 
decision differs from what one might expect based on the judge’s policymaking 
preferences might feel strongly influenced to rule in a certain way because 
of a powerful precedent that controls the decision. 217F216  One scholar uses a 
cooperative model pursuant to which “justices support stare decisis not 
because they normatively feel that they ought to, but because the long-term 
survival of their policy goals depends on it.”218F217  Because of the doctrine of 
stare decisis, observers make business decisions based on their understanding 
of the direction in which court decisions are heading. 219F218 
One might hope that judges engage in second-order reasoning to promote 
stability and legitimacy in case law.  Of course, certain facts distinguish a 
case presently under consideration from a precedent-setting earlier case and 
a judge is bound to follow prior precedent only if the facts in the two cases 
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are substantially similar.  The attorney representing one of the parties will 
argue that the present case is substantially similar to the precedent-setting 
case such that the judge is bound to rule in conformity with the prior  
precedent.  The opposing attorney might very well argue that there are 
differences so significant between the case under consideration and the 
potentially precedent-setting case that the prior case is not controlling on 
the present decision.  Similarly, the judge deciding the case could find leeway 
to determine either that the earlier case controls or does not control in the 
present case. 
Another theory, sometimes referred to as the attitudinal model, is that 
Justices decide cases in conformity with their ideological preferences. 220F219  
Pursuant to this model, judges follow their own policymaking preferences 
rather than follow a precedent that would have seemed to direct judges in 
a different direction. 221F220  The legal model of decision-making, pursuant to 
which Justices follow precedent, does not fully describe how the Justices 
decide cases.  “The legal model bleaches the decision-making process of 
its colorful human ingredients; it can be portrayed as an ultralogical, if not 
mechanical, analysis of applications of relevant statu[t]es and decisions.”222F221  
By the same token, the attitudinal model of decision-making, pursuant to 
which Justices are guided by their biases, does not fully describe how the 
Justices decide cases: “The attitudinal model, taken to its extreme, fails to 
recognize the constraints upon the judge as a professional person.” 223F222 
Still another theory is that Justices act strategically to reach their long-
term objectives. 224F223  “[S]trategic models propose that judges do not simply 
vote in ways that are plainly consistent with their attitudes, but make 
decisions that take into account the ways that the predicted actions of other 
players (such as their colleagues . . .) influence the feasibility of attaining 
their desired ends.”225F224  According to this strategic model of decision-making 
in the United States Supreme Court, “strategic considerations might lead 
the justices to take into account the prospective reactions of their colleagues 
as well as a variety of groups outside the Court, including . . . the general 
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public.”225  Judges may calculate how they can achieve the preferred outcome: 226F
“Strategic judges seek to affect the impressions of other people only for 
instrumental reasons—to win support for their positions from colleagues, 
to avoid negative reactions to their court’s decisions from other policy 
makers and the public . . . so they can continue to make legal policy.”226227F   At 
times, appellate court judges seek to gather a majority of the court in support 
of a particular opinion.  “Thus, judges may agree to decisions that do not 
completely effect their policy preferences to avoid results that depart even 
further from their preferences or may draft opinions in ways that do not 
perfectly represent their preferences in the instant case, but that will garner 
the necessary votes.”227228F  
Some scholars see an interplay between the strategic and attitudinal models 
of decision-making.  They reason that “Supreme Court justices are strategic, 
and they argue that strategic considerations affect what the justices do in 
most stages of decision making.  But in voting on the outcome of cases, they 
argue, justices have no strategic reasons to depart from their most preferred 
policy positions.” 229F228 
Tonja Jacobi theorizes that a Justice must balance a desire for the Court 
majority opinion to reach the outcome the Justice prefers—“optimization 
of outcome determination”—against the Justice garnering the votes of at 
least a majority of the Justices—“judicial coalition maximization.”230F229  Thus, 
a Justice weighs a number of factors in reaching a decision.  “The processing 
of information, analysis of alternatives, and selection among those alternatives 
that culminate in judges’ choices are hardly straightforward.  Even if 
we conceive of judicial decision making primarily in motivational terms, 
cognitive processes surely intervene between goals and choices.” F230  
A Justice balances numerous factors in arriving at the course the 
Justice follows: “It is clear that judicial decision making implicates a wide 
variety of objectives.  Judges may be required to balance, for example, a 
desire to follow precedent against preferred policy preferences, or to balance 
the effort needed to act strategically against a desire to limit workload, 
among other goal conflicts.”231232F   A Court observer should consider a number of 
theories if the observer wishes to analyze the factors a Justice considered in 
reaching a decision.  “Considering judges as decision makers who must 
reconcile numerous objectives in carrying out a variety of different decision 
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tasks provides an avenue toward a more nuanced view of the cognitive 
complexity of judicial decision making and may lead to increasingly 
sophisticated hypotheses about judicial behavior.” 233F232 
B.  Extra-Legal Factors and Unconscious Decision-Making 
In addition to the many psychological influences that judges are conscious 
of, there are numerous unconscious processes that might be influencing 
judicial decisions behind the scenes.  Psychologists have long recognized 
the powerful influence of unconscious psychological processes on human 
decision-making, and judges, by virtue of being human, are no exception 
to such influences. 234F233 
Of all the work done on unconscious processing, perhaps most relevant 
for the judicial decision-making process is the work done by the psychologist 
Jonathan Haidt on what he calls the social intuitionist model of judgment.235F234  
According to Haidt and many other psychologists, there is a mountain of 
evidence demonstrating that judgment and justification are two different 
processes; with respect to many moral judgments—the kind often involved 
in disputes at the level of the Constitution and the Supreme Court—the 
directional arrow goes backwards. 236F235  In his words, “Intuitions come first, 
strategic reasoning second.”237F236  Thus, those subscribing to this model might 
plausibly claim that a judge often reaches a judgment in a case by following 
a gut reaction to the proper resolution and, afterwards, constructs the description 
of the path of reasoning pursued to justify the preordained result.  In other 
words, it may indeed be the case that a judge’s stated ideology or use of 
precedent are not in fact guiding the decision at all but are in fact being used 
as tools to justify an intuition that is otherwise reduced to a gut feeling. 
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Let us look again at the quote from Justice Kennedy discussed earlier, 
where he explained his method of deciding a case as follows: 
But after you make a judgment you must then formulate the reason for your 
judgment into a verbal phrase, into a verbal formula.  And then you have to see 
if that makes sense, if it’s logical, if it’s fair, if it accords with the law, if it accords 
with the Constitution, if it accords with your own sense of ethics and morality.  
And, if at any point along this process you think you’re wrong, you have to go 
back and do it all over again.  And that’s, I think, not unique to the law, in that 
any prudent person behaves that way. 238F237 
One reading of Kennedy’s quote is that he is simply articulating the judicial 
embodiment of the social intuitionist model: first the judge makes a 
decision, and then, only after deciding, does the judge check that judgment 
against all of the various principles that are thought to, in fact, produce that 
judgment.  It is the intuition, not the principles, that truly inform the decision.  
The principles are merely the buttresses with which the judge constructs 
the written opinion. 
Other findings in psychology are also illuminating.  Brandon Bartels, 
applying “social psychological insights on the cognitive processes of 
judgment” to judicial decision-making, draws a distinction between top-
down and bottom-up processing that judges might use to guide their 
decisions. 239F238  On the one hand, some judges think of a broad context when 
faced with a determination.  “In a top-down reasoning process, the generic 
predispositions, perception, or theories people bring to a judgment context 
dictate how they process the new information in front of them.” 240F239  Other 
judges scrutinize the facts of the particular case: “[B]ottom-up processing 
involves objective scrutiny of the information, facts, or evidence at hand.”241F240 
Neal Devins and Lawrence Baum also employ insights from social  
psychology, but in a slightly different way.  They analyze the psychological 
motivation of Justices to earn the respect of the network of individuals within 
which they interact. 242F241  The two scholars see the networks of the Justices 
as comprised of elite individuals.243F242  “Today’s Justices are not simply partisan 
Democrats and Republicans.  They are also graduates of the Harvard and 
Yale Law Schools who interface with the affluent and well educated, especially 
other elites in the legal profession, academy, and media.”244F243  Justices Thomas 
and Sotomayor had more humble beginnings than the other Justices; even 
so, they both attended Yale Law School and became acclimatized to a rarified 
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environment. 245F244  Thus, Devins and Baum see that the current Justices seek 
the approval and respect of these elites, whose norms are “maintaining 
collegiality and acting on the basis of law.”246F245  Devins and Baum posit that 
this desire to have a good reputation among the elites, to maintain collegiality, 
and to follow the law leads to many unanimous opinions in Court cases 
but also leads to unpredictable votes in certain nonunanimous decisions 
like Carpenter. 247F246 
Besides being members of the elite, the Justices are unlike most of the 
country’s population.  Members of the judiciary, particularly those on the 
United States Supreme Court, differ significantly from the general public 
in age, race, education, and sex, as well as their lack of participation in the 
criminal justice system as suspects.  As a result, judges are likely to have 
a different concept of privacy than suspects.  One study surveying 1,200 
individuals made the following five findings: 
(1) [I]n general, the U.S. public has greater concerns for privacy than are  
reflected in current judicial doctrine. . . . 
(2) current judicial doctrine includes several relative judgments—e.g., giving no 
protection to emails held by an internet provider, but absolute protection to a 
bedroom—that do not reflect actual expectations of privacy in the United 
States. . . . 
(3) the ubiquitous practice of judgment in hindsight (i.e., with knowledge that a 
search has found evidence of crime) strongly decreases the likelihood that people 
will find violations of reasonable expectations or privacy. . . . 
(4) the pervasive practice of developing Fourth Amendment doctrine through 
criminal defendants’ suppression motions (in the third person) also decreases the 
likelihood of finding a violation. . . . 
(5) whites and older persons (beyond age 41)—such as those who dominate the 
U.S. state and federal judiciary—are less likely to find that police investigative 
practices invade privacy. 248F247 
Thus, case law findings of which police practices invade an individual’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy may not coincide with the view held by 
society.  Justice Alito was very well aware of the disconnect between the 
Justices and the public when he stated: “[J]udges are apt to confuse their 
 
 244.  Id. at 11. 
 245.  Id. 
 246.  See id. 
 247.  Bernard Chao et al., Why Courts Fail to Protect Privacy: Race, Age, Bias, and 
Technology, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 267 (2018) (numerals and spacing added). 
BAST_PATRICK (DO NOT DELETE) 6/1/2020  3:46 PM 
 
390 
own expectations of privacy with those of the hypothetical reasonable 
person.” 249F248 
The psychology of group dynamics is also relevant to appellate court 
decisions.  “[T]o achieve their most preferred policy outcome, judges on 
collegial [meaning multimember] courts must consider the likely actions 
of their colleagues on the bench to determine their best course of  
action . . . .”249250F   Even if a Justice has a strong ideological bent, a Justice 
does not base a decision solely on ideology: “Justices may be primarily 
seekers of legal policy, but they are not unconstrained actors who make 
decisions based only on their own ideological attitudes.”250251F   A Justice has 
to consider the viewpoints of other Justices: “[J]ustices are strategic actors 
who realize their ability to achieve their goals depends on a consideration 
of the preferences of other actors, the choices they expect others to make, 
and the institutional context in which they act.” 252F251  A Justice may feel an 
affinity with others on the court in that those Justices tend to align with their 
decisions, and certain Justices may tend to be in the majority in certain types 
of cases.  “[A] majority coalition [is] a group of ideologically simpatico 
justices who are able to issue unambiguous, far-reaching decisions, as 
opposed to fact-specific decisions of limited consequence.”253F252  Justices may 
pay more attention to other Justices in a coalition.  “Because members of 
a coalition on the Court will tend to hold similar, but not identical, views 
on a given issue, the opinions of the other members of the coalition will 
tend to be more influential to each other than any opinions of noncoalition 
members.”254F253  One of the Justices, such as Justice Kennedy often did, might 
side with one coalition on some types of issues and with another coalition 
on other types of issues: “‘Swing’ justices exercise power by writing 
consequential concurring opinions that limit the reach of the majority’s 
ruling or by insisting that their legal policy preferences are reflected in the 
majority opinion.” 255F254 
  
 
 248.  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 427 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 249.  Wendy L. Martinek, Judges as Members of Small Groups, in THE PSYCHOLOGY 
OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING, supra note 5, at 73, 73–74. 
 250.  Id. at 74 (quoting EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 103, at 10). 
 251.  Id. (quoting EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 103, at 10). 
 252.  Devins & Federspiel, supra note 12, at 85. 
 253.  Id. at 89. 
 254.  Id. at 91. 
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[Justices’] political attitudes undoubtedly play some role in their judgments and 
decisions, but many other aspects of a judge’s psychological make-up and of the 
social-psychological setting in which a judge acts will be influential as well, with 
some of these influences pushing the judge toward idealized normative behavior 
and some pushing the judge away from judicial ideals. 256F255 
Some theorize that United States Supreme Court Justices “pursue multiple 
goals; they act in ways that maximize their goals, and the institutions within 
which they operate sometimes affect their goals.  Thus, sometimes they must 
do things that fail, in the short run, to achieve their goals.”257F256  A Justice may 
carefully consider the likely actions of the other Justices in the language 
and line of reasoning the Justice employs in crafting an opinion.  “The 
writers of draft opinions must always count votes, and thus they must be 
careful to draft opinions that do not jeopardize defections from the majority.  
Sometimes they must put aside their most preferred opinions to generate 
a definitive ruling for the Court.”258F257  Of course, another strategy for a Justice 
is to conform to the Justice’s preferred policy and influence others to follow 
by bolstering the preferred policy with references to as many precedents 
as are available.259F258  When a Justice decides to overturn a previous precedent, 
a Justice may buttress the overruling by persuasive authority in the absence 
of primary authority. 260F259 
IV.  CARPENTER V. UNITED STATES 
The previous parts of this Article have given a broad overview of some 
of the main influences on judicial decision-making, with a particular focus 
on how these influences manifest in Supreme Court decision-making.  
Explicitly, there are two primary pillars: a Justice’s policymaking preferences, 
particularly the Justice’s jurisprudential ideology and political leanings, on 
the one hand, and the effect of precedent, including the Justice’s precedential 
philosophy and the doctrine of stare decisis, on the other.  Implicitly, there 
are also a number of other psychological factors that influence a Justice’s 
decision-making outside of conscious awareness, including an inclination 
to use reason to justify intuition and the influence of coalitional dynamics.  
 
 255.  Gregory Mitchell, Evaluating Judges, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION 
MAKING, supra note 5, at 221, 223. 
 256.  WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 13, at 131–32. 
 257.  Id. at 139. 
 258.  HUME, supra note 23, at 106. 
 259.  Id. at 106–07. 
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With this rubric in hand, we turn now to the Court’s landmark 2018 decision 
in Carpenter v. United States. 
A.  An Introduction to Technology and the Fourth Amendment 
For more than 200 years, the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution has protected citizens’ “persons, houses, papers, and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.” 261F260  Over those same years, 
the federal courts have been interpreting that language to weigh the 
conflict between, on one hand, the privacy afforded the individual against, 
on the other hand, the intrusion necessitated by law enforcement in gathering 
evidence of criminal activity.  Many feel that citizens must view this  
interpretation as legitimate for them to conform when case law restricts 
their behavior. 262F261  The foundation of the Fourth Amendment is the tension 
between police investigation of criminal wrongdoing and a citizen’s right 
to privacy.263F262  Psychology aides understanding of the forces behind Fourth 
Amendment interpretation by reviewing the motivation of judges in deciding 
Fourth Amendment cases and the behavior of citizens reacting to Fourth 
Amendment interpretation. 
Self-interested entrepreneurs and landowners were the key actors who 
drove the American Revolutionary War and who, for the most part, took 
it upon themselves to remain informed about each other’s self-interests.264F263  
They recognized that even a law-abiding citizen has the right to keep certain 
information hidden and should not be forced to open otherwise private 
areas to public view.  Their understanding of self-interest in safeguarding 
certain areas of their lives safe from disclosure to law enforcement authority 
informed the Constitution, which recognizes that the perils of political power 
are best mitigated by structural checks against the exercise of power by 
anyone, even those who seem—however falsely—to be free of conflicts. 
The individual’s desire to enjoy this freedom from disclosure guaranteed 
under the United States Constitution is necessarily in tension with society’s 
need for law enforcement to control crime by stopping and preventing crimes 
 
 260.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 261.  See, e.g., John Darley et al., Psychological Jurisprudence: Taking Psychology 
and Law Into the Twenty-First Century, in TAKING PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW INTO THE TWENTY- 
FIRST CENTURY 35, 42–43 (James R.P. Ogloff ed., 2002).  But see DEBRA LIEBERMAN & 
CARLTON PATRICK, OBJECTION: DISGUST, MORALITY, AND THE LAW 193–95 (2018) (arguing 
that overcoming public objection to certain legal rulings should rightly be considered an 
issue of information dissemination and winning the public confidence in the judgment rather 
than conforming to initial public opinion). 
 262.  See Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1456, 1457–66 (1996). 
 263.  See James W. Ely, Jr., Economic Liberties and the Original Meaning of the 
Constitution, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 673, 674, 687 (2008). 
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from occurring.  Even an individual accused of committing a crime has 
the right to due process to safeguard the individual’s Fourth Amendment 
right.  When law enforcement officers violate an individual’s legitimate 
expectation of privacy by search and seizure, the remedy is to bar any 
evidence gathered from use at trial. 265F264 
What are the two biggest challenges in interpreting the Fourth Amendment?  
Answering this question requires understanding the tension between privacy 
and law enforcement, and why that tension makes many cases involving 
privacy difficult ones to decide.  These cases are difficult because they require 
the judiciary to draw lines; the division between privacy and law enforcement 
causes consternation, as precedent and legal theory must support the rationale 
and the standard separating the realm in which citizens are entitled to privacy 
from law enforcement intrusion into what would otherwise remain private.  
These privacy decisions have become increasingly onerous in the twenty-
first century, when changes seem to come at lightning speed.  Consequently, 
one might readily agree that the two biggest challenges the courts face in 
interpreting the Fourth Amendment are fast-moving advances in technology 
and rapid changes in social practice. 
Advancing technology has been a hurdle in interpreting the Fourth 
Amendment for quite a while.  Some claim that the United States Supreme 
Court has not be a forerunner in technology for more than 170 years. 266F265  It 
was not too long ago that Judge Posner noted, “Recent U.S. Supreme Court 
cases involving technology-related issues indicate that several Justices are 
embarrassingly ignorant about computing and communication methods that 
many Americans take for granted.”267F266  We are in a time of rapid technological 
change and a doctrine announced within a person’s lifetime may not survive 
when technology causes the doctrine to become outmoded.  Commentators 
have long perceived the Court as behind, rather than in front, of the ball when 
considering how it should deal with technology.268F267  Of course, the Court is 
not the only government institution that is relatively clueless about emerging 
technology.  Daniel Solove claims: “There may be a few in Congress with 
 
 264.  Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484–85 (1963). 
 265.  Susan Freiwald & Stephen Wm. Smith, Comment, The Carpenter Chronicle: A 
Near-Perfect Surveillance, 132 HARV. L. REV. 205, 205 (2018). 
 266.  RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 79 (2013) (quoting Mark Grabowski, 
Are Technical Difficulties at the Supreme Court Causing a “Disregard of Duty”?, 3 CASE 
W. RES. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 93, 93 (2011)). 
 267.  E.g., Grabowski, supra note 266, at 96–97. 
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a good understanding of the technology, but many lack the foggiest idea 
about how new technologies work.” 269F268 
Law enforcement authorities seem eager and are motivated to use new 
technology to gather evidence.  For example, one area of concern is the 
law enforcement practice of combining two or more technologies, such as 
facial recognition with officer-worn body cameras 270F269 and use of software-
linked tasers, patrol car mounted or officer-worn cameras, drones, and cell 
phones.271F270  The term “dataveillance” refers to the ability of computers to 
conduct visual or other surveillance, manipulate that with captured data, 
and produce and transmit results. 2 7 2 F271  Another area of concern is law 
enforcement’s use of radio frequency identification, pursuant to which law 
enforcement authorities transmit personal identifying information wirelessly.273F272  
Law enforcement has the capability to use cell-site simulators to intercept 
cell phone data such as a caller’s location, text messages, and phone calls; 
even if law enforcement does obtain a warrant to intercept signals from a 
particular user’s cell phone, the interception is controversial in that it 
scoops up digital information from other cell phones as well.273274F   Besides 
this potential spillover problem, there is a potential aggregation problem 
in that, where a massive amount of data has been collected, law enforcement 
can further analyze the collected data to draw connections that may negatively 
impact an individual’s privacy.274275F   Technology is an area in which the 
legitimacy and influence of the Court might be at risk.  New technology was 
behind the United States Supreme Court decisions in Riley v. California,275276F  
United States v. Jones,276277F  and Carpenter v. United States.277278F  
 
 268.  Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr’s Misguided 
Call for Judicial Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 771 (2005). 
 269.  Katelyn Ringrose, Law Enforcement’s Pairing of Facial Recognition Technology 
with Body-Worn Cameras Escalates Privacy Concerns, 105 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 57, 60 (2019). 
 270.  See All Products, AXON, https://www.axon.com/products [https://perma.cc/ 
FX6V-LM88]. 
 271.  M. Ryan Calo, People Can Be So Fake: A New Dimension to Privacy and 
Technology Scholarship, 114 PENN. ST. L. REV. 809, 822 (2010). 
 272.  See id. at 814–15, 815 n.32. 
 273.  The devices that mimic cell phone towers are popularly referred to as “StingRays,” 
“TriggerFish,” or international mobile subscriber identities (IMSI).  Carrie Leonetti, A 
Hailstorm of Uncertainty: The Constitutional Quandary of Cell-Cite Simulators, 85 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 665, 667 (2017). 
 274.  See Matthew Tokson, The Normative Fourth Amendment, 104 MINN. L. REV. 
741, 784 (2019). 
 275.  134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480 (2014); see infra notes 350–60 and accompanying text. 
 276.  565 U.S. 400, 400 (2012); see infra notes 322–49 and accompanying text. 
 277.  138 S. Ct. 2206, 2208–09 (2018); see infra notes 392–405 and accompanying 
text. 
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Another hurdle has been changes in social practice.  Carpenter highlighted 
this challenge, as well as the challenge posed by new technology. 279F278  
Changes in social practice in the use of the telephone led to the transition 
from Olmstead v. United States 280F279 to Katz v. United States. 281F280  Since those 
cases, cellular telephones have evolved into a combination of a computer, 
a camera, and a telephone.  The new social practice is for almost everyone 
to have a personal cell phone and to carry the phone wherever one goes.  
Another social practice not yet considered by the Court is the widespread 
use of digital smart devices that are becoming commonplace in the emerging 
Internet of Things.  These digital smart devices, installed in various locations 
throughout the home, have the ability to communicate with each other through 
something sometimes referenced as ubiquitous computing.281282F   Employers 
make increasing use of technology to monitor and surveil employee activity; 
some commentators are concerned that this data collection has a negative 
effect on privacy.282283F   The ability of digital assistants to memorialize conversations 
and sounds may facilitate their use by law enforcement as surveillance 
intermediaries.283284F   Still another social practice is for at least the majority 
of the population to provide their data to large technology companies, either 
by posting on social networking sites or by using products of these companies 
to perform tasks online.  Some search engines incorporate social interfaces 
that appear to be persons, but, in reality, these interfaces are technologically 
sophisticated human facsimiles to which users react as if the interfaces 
 
 278.  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2208–09; see infra notes 392–405 and accompanying text. 
 279.  277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 
(1947). 
 280.  389 U.S. 347 see infra notes 291–297, 456–457 and accompanying text. 
 281.  Calo, supra note 271, at 814–15, 814 n.31. 
 282.  See ALEXANDRA MATEESCU & AIHA NGUYEN, EXPLAINER: WORKPLACE MONITORING 
& SURVEILLANCE 1–2 (2019), https://datasociety.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/DS_Workplace_ 
Monitoring_Surveillance_Explainer.pdf [https://perma.cc/9K2U-QCEK]; Sam Adler-
Bell & Michelle Miller, The Datafication of Employment: How Surveillance and 
Capitalism Are Shaping Workers’ Futures Without Their Knowledge, CENTURY FOUND. (Dec. 
18, 2018), https://tcf.org/content/report/datafication-employment-surveillance-capitalism- 
shaping-workers-futures-without-knowledge/?agreed=1 [https://perma.cc/Q595-4MSD]; 
see also Donald P. Boyle Jr. et al., Strategies for Risk Mitigation in Production and 
Distribution of IoT Devices, LAW.COM (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.law.com/legal 
technews/2019/03/19/strategies-for-risk-mitigation-in-production-and-distribution-of-
iot-devices/ [perma.cc/ YQ3C-7J35]. 
 283.  Alexandra Carthew, Case Comment, Searches and Seizures—Fourth Amendment 
and Reasonableness in General: Protection of Privacy Interests in the Digital Age, 94 N.D. L. 
REV. 197, 217–18 (2019). 
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were human. 285F284  It may not be long until personal robots perform a variety 
of tasks in many homes. 286F285  The resulting, but largely unregulated, power 
of these companies to collect great swathes of personal data through social 
technology and to potentially share the data with the government has coined 
the term the “Facebook Unbound phenomenon.” 287F286 
These two challenges of advancements in technology and changes in 
social practice highlight what had become the unworkable nature of the 
third-party doctrine announced in United States v. Miller288F287 and Smith v. 
Maryland; 289F288 one who is participating in the modern world has no choice 
but to turn over otherwise private information to a third party, thereby 
losing Fourth Amendment protection for the information.  Changes in 
technology and social practice shifted too much power from the individual 
to law enforcement.  Ryan Calo called the third-party doctrine one of the 
hungry doctrinal exceptions to privacy law. 290F289  According to Calo, the 
third-party doctrine is hungry in that, prior to Carpenter, this exception to 
a reasonable expectation of privacy had become so broad that it was 
moving to consume a greater and greater portion of one’s privacy. 291F290  The 
United States Supreme Court was motivated to readjust the balance of 
power between the individual and law enforcement as to the extent the 
individual should be forced to disclose otherwise private information.  As 
further described below, Carpenter narrowed the third-party doctrine; 
however, the extent to which the third-party doctrine survives is open to 
discussion. 
B.  Technology Cases Prior to Carpenter 
Katz is the 1967 United States Supreme Court case that brought the Court 
into the modern era because it departed from a reliance on real property-
based reasoning.  Katz stated the issue as, “Whether a public telephone booth 
is a constitutionally protected area so that evidence obtained by attaching an 
electronic listening recording device to the top of such a booth is obtained 
in violation of the right to privacy of the user of the booth.” 292F291  The Court 
rejected the government’s argument that law enforcement did not need a 
warrant prior to taping Katz’s end of the conversation. 293F292  The Court stated 
 
 284.  See Calo, supra note 271, at 811, 813. 
 285.  Id. at 814. 
 286.  Ashley Deeks, Forward: Facebook Unbound?, 105 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 5 (2019). 
 287.  425 U.S. 435, 435 (1976). 
 288.  442 U.S. 735, 735 (1979). 
 289.  Ryan Calo, Privacy Law’s Indeterminacy, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 33, 45 (2019). 
 290.  See id. 
 291.  389 U.S. 347, 349 (1967). 
 292.  Id. at 358. 
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that accepting the government’s argument violated the Fourth Amendment 
because permitting such surveillance without a warrant would cast an 
individual’s privacy under the control of law enforcement discretion. 294F293  
The Court concluded, “[W]e hold [a warrant] to be a constitutional precondition 
of the kind of electronic surveillance involved in this case .”295F294  In his 
concurrence in Katz, Justice Harlan gave birth to an individual’s right 
under the Fourth Amendment to a reasonable expectation of privacy. 296F295  
Justice Harlan stated: “My understanding of the rule that has emerged from 
prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person 
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, 
that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”297F296  This right provides constitutional protection for information 
the individual transmits with a belief that the information is private so long 
as the belief is reasonable. 298F297 
In two cases from the latter part of the 1970s, United States v. Miller299F298 
and Smith v. Maryland,300F299 the police used standard investigative techniques 
to obtain incriminating information concerning suspects.301F300  The techniques 
were to subpoena bank records from banks 302F301 and to use a pen register 
to collect numbers dialed from a landline telephone. 303F302  The cases were 
similar in that neither case involved advanced technology; in both cases, 
law enforcement obtained the incriminating information from entities, namely 
banks and a telephone company, and not from the suspects themselves.304F303  The 
fact that law enforcement obtained the incriminating information from third 
parties gave birth to the third-party doctrine.  The following is a more in-depth 
review of the two cases. 
In 1976, the Court decided United States v. Miller, 305F304 a case in which 
the federal Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Bureau obtained Miller’s bank 
 
 293.  Id. at 358–59. 
 294.  Id. at 359. 
 295.  See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 296.  Id. 
 297.  Id. 
 298.  425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 299.  442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 300.  See id. at 737; Miller, 425 U.S. at 437–38. 
 301.  Miller, 425 U.S. at 438–39. 
 302.  Smith, 442 U.S. at 737. 
 303.  See id. at 737; Miller, 425 U.S. at 438. 
 304.  Miller, 425 U.S. 435. 
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records from two banks by grand jury subpoena.306F305  Justice Powell, writing 
the majority opinion, held that: 
Since no Fourth Amendment interests of the depositor are implicated here, this 
case is governed by the general rule that the issuance of a subpoena to a third 
party to obtain the records of that party does not violate the rights of a defendant, 
even if a criminal prosecution is contemplated at the time the subpoena is  
issued.307F306 
Miller relied on Katz in arguing that he had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his bank records. 308F307  However, the Court found that Miller had 
assumed the risk that the banks might disclose the bank records.309F308  In Justice 
Brennan’s dissent, he pointed out that Miller’s submission of information 
to his banks was not voluntary: “For all practical purposes, the disclosure 
by individuals or business firms of their financial affairs to a bank is not 
entirely volitional, since it is impossible to participate in the economic life 
of contemporary society without maintaining a bank account.” 310F309  Justice 
Brennan added: “In the course of such dealings, a depositor reveals many 
aspects of his personal affairs, opinions, habits and associations.  Indeed, 
the totality of bank records provides a virtual current biography.” 311F310 
In 1979 in Smith v. Maryland, the police asked the telephone company 
to install a pen register at the telephone company to determine the telephone 
numbers dialed from suspect Smith’s home telephone.312F311  Justice Blackmun, 
writing the majority opinion, stated: “We therefore conclude that petitioner 
in all probability entertained no actual expectation of privacy in the phone 
numbers he dialed, and that, even if he did, his expectation was not 
‘legitimate.’” 313F312  Justice Blackmun found that there was no constitutional 
violation: “The installation and use of a pen register, consequently, was 
not a ‘search,’ and no warrant was required.”314F313  Justices Stewart and Marshall 
wrote dissenting opinions. 315F314  In his dissent, Justice Stewart emphasized 
the nonvoluntary nature of a telephone subscriber providing the numbers 
the subscriber wishes to call to the telephone company. 316F315  “A telephone 
call simply cannot be made without the use of telephone company property 
 
 305.  Id. at 437–39. 
 306.  Id. at 444. 
 307.  Id. at 442 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967)). 
 308.  Id. at 443. 
 309.  Id. at 451 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 310.  Id. 
 311.  442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979). 
 312.  Id. at 745. 
 313.  Id. at 745–46. 
 314.  Id. at 746 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 748 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 315.  Id. at 746 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
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and without payment to the company for the service.” 317F316  In his dissent, 
Justice Marshall highlighted the fact that the telephone company forces 
one who wishes to make a telephone call to provide the dialed number to 
the telephone company. 318F317  “Implicit in the concept of assumption of risk 
is some notion of choice. . . .  By contrast here, unless a person is prepared 
to forgo use of what for many has become a personal or professional  
necessity, he cannot help but accept the risk of surveillance.” 319F318  Justice 
Marshall pointed out the inapplicability of the idea that Smith assumed 
the risk of providing telephone numbers to the telephone company. 320F319  “It 
is idle to speak of ‘assuming’ risks in contexts where, as a practical matter, 
individuals have no realistic alternative.” 321F320 
The Court did not confront law enforcement use of advanced communication 
technology to obtain incriminating information until more than three 
decades later in Riley v. California.322F321  Between Smith v. Maryland and 
Riley v. California, the Court decided United States v. Jones,323F322 a case in which 
law enforcement used new technology in service of the older law enforcement 
technique of tracking a suspect’s vehicle.324F323  Although Jones did not involve 
communication technology, it is a precursor to Carpenter in that, in both 
Jones and Carpenter, law enforcement agents were using technology to 
ascertain where the suspects had traveled over a time period. 325F324 
In Jones, Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion in which Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Sotomayor joined.326F325  In Jones, 
Justice Scalia stated the issue as “whether the attachment of a Global-
Positioning-System (GPS) tracking device to an individual’s vehicle, and 
subsequent use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements on public 
streets, constitutes a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.”327F326  The Court’s holding was fairly predictable: “We hold that 
 
 316.  Id. 
 317.  See id. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 318.  Id. at 749–50. 
 319.  Id. at 750. 
 320.  Id. 
 321.  134 S. Ct. 2480, 2480 (2014). 
 322.  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 323.  Id. at 400–03. 
 324.  Compare id. at 403 (finding the government used a tracking device to trace a 
vehicle’s movements for twenty-eight days), with Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 
2206, 2212 (2018) (finding the government used cell phone service records to track suspects 
over a four-month period). 
 325.  Jones, 565 U.S. at 401. 
 326.  Id. at 402. 
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the Government’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and 
its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a 
‘search.’”328F327  In a perhaps surprising move, given that Court observers thought 
that the Court had long departed from a real property analysis of Fourth 
Amendment cases, Justice Scalia’s opinion took an “exclusively property-
based approach” to the issue329F328 rather than applying the reasonable expectation 
of privacy test from Katz. 330F329  However, Justice Scalia did not discredit 
Katz.  Justice Scalia explained that the Court might use the trespass concept 
when considering a physical intrusion made by law enforcement, but the 
Court might use the reasonable expectation of privacy test when considering 
a nonphysical intrusion.331F330  Justice Scalia referenced Justice Alito’s concurring 
opinion that solely concurred in the judgment: “For unlike the concurrence, 
which would make Katz the exclusive test, we do not make trespass the 
exclusive test.  Situations involving merely the transmission of electronic 
signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.” 332F331 
In her concurrence in Jones, which concurred in the majority opinion 
and in the judgment, Justice Sotomayor both endorses Justice Scalia’s trespass 
approach while introducing what has come to be referenced as the mosaic 
approach to considering whether law enforcement action constitutes a 
search under the Fourth Amendment.333F332  “GPS monitoring generates a precise, 
comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects a wealth 
of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual 
associations.” 334F333  Justice Sotomayor added: 
I would take these attributes of GPS monitoring into account when considering 
the existence of a reasonable societal expectation of privacy in the sum of one’s 
public movements.  I would ask whether people reasonably expect that their  
movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the Government 
to ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual 
habits, and so on. 335F334 
  
 
 327.  Id. at 404 (footnote omitted). 
 328.  See id. at 405.  In fact, Justice Scalia comments that the concurring opinion 
characterized the majority opinion as “applying ‘18th-century tort law’” to decide Jones.  
Id. at 411. 
 329.  Id. at 411. 
 330.  Id. 
 331.  Id. 
 332.  Id. at 415–16 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 333.  Id. at 415. 
 334.  Id. at 416. 
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The mosaic approach comes from United States v. Maynard.336F335  Maynard 
was a consolidated appeal taken by defendants Maynard and Jones to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 337F336  
After the intermediate appellate court reversed Jones’ conviction 338F337—the 
same Jones who is the defendant in the United States Supreme Court in 
Jones—the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 339F338 
Justice Alito also concurred in the judgment in Jones but not in the 
majority opinion, and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan joined in 
Justice Alito’s concurring opinion, which was longer than the majority 
opinion by a few pages. 340F339  Justice Alito’s main concern with the majority 
opinion is Justice Scalia’s use of real property-based theory, which Justice 
Alito finds to be “highly artificial.” 341F340  A good portion of the concurrence 
explains that trespass theory in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was no 
longer viable after Katz.342F341  Then, Justice Alito explains four other problems 
with the reasoning of the majority opinion.343F342  The first problem is that law 
enforcement might use technology to monitor a suspect’s movements over 
an extended time period, yet without committing a trespass.344F343  The second 
problem is that a trespass could occur even if the use of the GPS attached 
to the car was brief, and a trespass would not have occurred had law enforcement 
authorities attached the GPS prior to the suspect’s wife loaning the car to 
the suspect. 345F344  The third problem is that ownership of a car varies by state, 
depending on a state’s law governing spousal property ownership. 346F345  The 
fourth problem is that case law is unclear as to whether trespass to chattels 
can occur with electronic contact. 347F346 
In the balance of the concurrence, Justice Alito explains how Katz is a 
difficult case to use as precedent and points out that the constant advances 
in technology pose difficulties in interpreting whether the Fourth Amendment 
applies because technology constantly provides law enforcement new and 
 
 335.  615 F.3d 544, 558, 561–62 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 336.  Id. at 548–49. 
 337.  Id. at 568. 
 338.  Jones, 565 U.S. at 404. 
 339.  See id. at 418–31 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 340.  Id. at 419. 
 341.  Id. at 421–27. 
 342.  Id. at 424–27. 
 343.  Id. at 424–25. 
 344.  Id. at 425. 
 345.  Id. at 425–26. 
 346.  Id. at 426–27. 
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better methods to gather evidence concerning criminal suspects. 348F347  Justice 
Alito would have stated the issue as “whether [Jones’] reasonable expectations 
of privacy were violated by the long-term monitoring of the movements 
of the vehicle he drove.” 349F348  In reaching a conclusion, Justice Alito used 
reasoning from Maynard and stated: “[T]he lengthy monitoring that occurred 
in this case constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment.” 350F349 
In Riley, the Court considered whether, in a search incident to an arrest, 
a police officer is required to obtain a warrant prior to searching cell phone 
data. 351F350  The Court held that, as far as “searches of data on cell phones” is 
concerned, “officers must generally secure a warrant before conducting 
such a search.” 352F351  In weighing the security of the police officer in making 
an arrest against the privacy of the suspect, the opinion recognized the 
place a cell phone occupies in the everyday existence of most adults in the 
United States, such that the cell phone is “a pervasive and insistent part of 
daily life.” 353F352  The Court distinguished cell phone data from physical 
records, noting that cell phone data is different because of the amount and 
quality of the data stored on the telephone.354F353  The reality is that a cell phone 
is a “minicomputer”355F354 that contains “a cache of sensitive personal information” 
dating back at least to the individual’s acquisition of the cell phone . 356F355  
The final quality differentiating physical records from cell phone data is 
that most United States adults are never far away from their cell phones; 
this makes a search of cell phone data a much more serious intrusion on 
the individual’s privacy.356357F   Justice Alito authored a concurrence and stated 
that he wrote a separate concurring opinion “to address two points.”357358F   
First, he explains that the basis of the exception permitting an officer to 
perform a search incident to an arrest is not “the need to protect the safety 
of arresting officers and the need to prevent the destruction of evidence.”358359F   
Second, Justice Alito would prefer either the national or the state legislature 
to enact legislation that takes a more nuanced approach to the “balancing 
of law enforcement and privacy interests”359360F  when considering the types 
 
 347.  Id. at 427–31. 
 348.  Id. at 419. 
 349.  See id. at 431. 
 350.  134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480 (2014). 
 351.  Id. at 2485. 
 352.  See id. at 2484. 
 353.  Id. at 2488–89. 
 354.  Id. at 2489. 
 355.  Id. at 2490. 
 356.  Id. 
 357.  Id. at 2495 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 358.  Id. 
 359.  Id. at 2496–97. 
BAST_PATRICK (DO NOT DELETE) 6/1/2020  3:46 PM 
[VOL. 57:  357, 2020]  Information Otherwise Unknowable 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 403 
of information, be it digital or nondigital, an officer might freely gather 
without obtaining a warrant. 361F360 
As explained above, one reason for the Court to grant certiorari is to 
reverse a lower court opinion, which happened in part in Riley and which 
happened in Carpenter. 362F361  A second reason is to resolve a split in the 
lower courts, which is what happened in Riley. 363F362  Jones did not involve 
the reversal of a lower court opinion nor did it involve a split in the lower 
courts. 364F363  In Jones, the Court affirmed the intermediate appellate federal 
court decision in favor of defendant Jones. 365F364  In Riley, a consolidated 
case, the Court reversed the California state intermediate appellate court 
decision in Riley in favor of the State of California but affirmed the intermediate 
appellate federal court decision in Wurie in favor of defendant Wurie. 366F365  
In Carpenter, the Court reversed the intermediate appellate federal court 
decision in favor of the United States. 367F366 
Jones, Riley, and Carpenter are similar in that all three were criminal 
cases with the government as one party to each case. 368F367  The Office of the 
Solicitor General was involved in Jones, Riley, and Carpenter, which would 
be typical given that all three are criminal cases. 3 6 9 F368  What is atypical is 
that the Office of the Solicitor General represented a losing party in all 
three cases; however, the cases were ideological in nature with a conflict 
between the power of law enforcement to obtain evidence in a criminal 
case and the individual’s right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment. 370F369 
The time period within which the Court granted certiorari and decided 
a case following oral argument may be significant in indicating the difficulty 
the Court faced in deciding a case.  The Court in Jones took a little over 
two months, April 15, 2011 to June 27, 2011, 371F370 to grant the petition for 
writ of certiorari and one- and one-half months, November 8, 2011 to January 
 
 360.  See id. 
 361.  See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text. 
 362.  See Riley, 124 S. Ct. at 2477. 
 363.  565 U.S. 400, 400 (2012). 
 364.  Id. at 413. 
 365.  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494–95. 
 366.  138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018). 
 367.  See id. at 2211; Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480–82; Jones, 565 U.S. at 402. 
 368.  See Office of the Solicitor General, DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/osg 
[https://perma.cc/8RAK-AWEY]. 
 369.  See supra notes 118–21, 260–86 and accompanying text. 
 370.  No. 10-1259, SUP. CT. U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/ 
docketfiles/10-1259.htm [https://perma.cc/P3A6-YL56]. 
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23, 2012,372F371 from oral argument to decide Jones.  The Court in Riley took 
ten months, July 30, 2013 (Riley)373F372 and August 15, 2013 (Wurie) to January 
17, 2014,374F373 to grant the petition for writ of certiorari and two months, 
April 29, 2014 to June 25, 2014, 375F374 from oral argument to decide Riley.  
In Carpenter, the Court took a little over eight months, September 26, 
2016 to June 5, 2017, 376F375 to grant the petition for writ of certiorari and 
almost seven months, November 29, 2017 to June 22, 2018, 377F376 to issue a 
decision.  Thus, the Court took significantly longer to grant certiorari in 
Carpenter than it did in Jones, and the Court took significantly longer 
to decide Carpenter than it did to decide Jones or Riley; both Riley and 
Carpenter were decided at the end of the Court term. 
The number of opinions and the authorship of those opinions is significant 
in cases decided by the United States Supreme Court.  Gauged by the number 
of opinions, Jones and Carpenter appear to have been tougher decisions 
for the Court than was Riley.  Following Justice Scalia’s death, Justice Gorsuch 
joined the Court and wrote one of the dissenting opinions in Carpenter.378F377  
Both Jones and Carpenter had five Justices joining in the majority opinion.379F378  
However, the lineup of the remaining four Justices differed significantly 
between Jones and Carpenter.  In Jones, Justice Sotomayor wrote an opinion 
concurring with the majority opinion and Justice Alito wrote an opinion 
concurring in the judgment, with three other Justices joining in Justice 
Alito’s concurring opinion.380F379  In Jones, Justice Alito’s thirteen-page opinion 
concurred in the judgment of the five-Justice majority, but the concurring 
opinion did not join in the majority opinion.381F380  While Jones and Riley each 
contained one or more concurring opinions, no Justice dissented in either 
case.382F381  In contrast, a number of the Justices dissented from Carpenter and 
each dissenting Justice wrote a lengthy dissenting opinion.383F382 Carpenter 
contained four dissenting opinions authored by Justices Kennedy, joined 
 
 371.  Jones, 565 U.S. at 400. 
 372.  No. 13-132, SUP. CT. U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/ 
docketfiles/13-132.htm [https://perma.cc/FR3S-PVDQ]. 
 373.  No 13-212, SUP. CT. U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/ 
docketfiles/13-212.htm [https://perma.cc/SHE8-NPQA]. 
 374.  134 S. Ct. 2473, 2473 (2014). 
 375.  Carpenter v. United States, SCOTUS BLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/case-
files/cases/carpenter-v-united-states-2/ [https://perma.cc/7LYS-2UQE] [hereinafter Carpenter 
v. United States, SCOTUS BLOG]. 
 376.  Id. 
 377.  138 S. Ct. 2206, 2261 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 378.  Id. at 2211 (majority opinion); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 401 (2012). 
 379.  Jones, 565 U.S. at 401. 
 380.  See id. at 418–31 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 381.  See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2479 (2014); Jones, 565 U.S. at 401. 
 382.  See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211. 
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in by Justices Thomas and Alito, Thomas, Alito, joined in by Justice Thomas, 
and Gorsuch. 384F383 
Of the three most recent opinions concerning technology—Jones, Riley, 
and Carpenter—Riley appears to have been the easiest of the three to 
decide.  Riley garnered eight Justices joining in the majority opinion, with 
Justice Alito writing a concurring opinion that concurred in part with the 
majority and concurred in the judgment. 385F384  As is his prerogative, Chief 
Justice Roberts assigned himself to author the majority opinion in both Riley 
and Carpenter. 386F385  The length of the Riley majority opinion, at twenty-five 
pages, may indicate Chief Justice Roberts’ perceived need to provide sufficient 
reasoning to support the judgment. 387F386  Justice Alito’s concurring opinion 
was only three pages long; although Justice Alito felt the need to write a 
concurring opinion, Justice Alito’s concurrence in Riley was less than one- 
quarter the length of Justice Alito’s concurrence in Jones.387F   The membership 
of the Court was the same in Jones and Riley.  Justice Scalia authored the 
majority opinion in Jones and joined in the majority opinion in Riley.388389F   
The length of the Jones majority opinion, at eleven pages, may indicate an 
opinion written narrowly to gain the necessary majority vote. 389F   Justice 
Sotomayor’s concurring opinion in Jones totaled five pages.390391F   Justice Alito’s 
concurring opinion in Jones was longer than the majority opinion, at 
thirteen pages.391392F  
388
3 9 0
C.  The Carpenter Decision 
In the run-up to the Supreme Court’s decision in Carpenter, Judge Stranch 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit foregrounded 
the intersection of Fourth Amendment cases that Chief Justice Roberts 
would echo in his opinion.392  In her concurrence in the intermediate 
appellate court, Judge Stranch cited to both Justice Alito’s concurrence 
 
 383.  Id. 
 384.  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2479. 
 385.  See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211; Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480. 
 386.  See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480–95. 
 387.  Compare id. at 2495–98 (Alito, J., concurring), with United States v. Jones, 565 
U.S. 400, 418–31 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 388.  See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2479; Jones, 565 U.S. at 401. 
 389.  See Jones, 565 U.S. at 402–13. 
 390.  Id. at 413–18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 391.  Id. at 419–431 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 392.  138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214–16 (2018). 
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and Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Jones394F393 and stated: “[T]he sheer 
quantity of sensitive information procured without a warrant in this case 
raises Fourth Amendment concerns.”395F394  Judge Stranch also pinpointed the 
intersection, which Justice Roberts would later highlight, of two lines of 
Fourth Amendment cases, “the intersection of the law governing tracking 
of personal location and the law governing privacy interests in business 
records,” 396F395 as causing difficulty in that the judiciary has the unenviable 
task of identifying the boundary circumscribing Fourth Amendment 
protection.397F396  Judge Stranch closed her concurring opinion with a perhaps 
prophetic thought: “The runaway pace of technological development 
makes this task more difficult. . . . [W]e have more work to do to determine 
the best methods for assessing the application of the Fourth Amendment 
in the context of new technology.” 398F397 
In Carpenter, Chief Justice Roberts stated the issue as “whether the 
Government conducts a search under the Fourth Amendment when it 
accesses historical cell phone records that provide a comprehensive 
chronicle of the user’s past movements.” 399F398  He took Carpenter out from 
under the shadow of the third-party doctrine.  “Given the unique nature of 
cell phone location records, the fact that the information is held by a third 
party does not by itself overcome the user’s claim to Fourth Amendment 
protection.”400F399  He stated the answer to the question raised: “Whether the 
Government employs its own surveillance technology as in Jones or leverages 
the technology of a wireless carrier, we hold that an individual maintains 
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his physical movements 
as captured through [cell site location information (CSLI)].” 401F400 
Chief Justice Roberts provided little theory to support his majority 
opinion overruling of Miller and Smith. 402F401  The length of the Carpenter 
majority opinion, at twelve pages, may indicate a fairly narrowly reasoned 
opinion.403F402  Justice Kennedy’s dissent and Justice Thomas’s dissent were 
each also twelve pages in length.404F403  Justice Alito’s dissent, slightly longer, 
was fourteen pages in length and Justice Gorsuch’s dissent, at eleven pages 
 
 393.  United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 893–95 (6th Cir. 2016) (Stranch, J., 
concurring), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
 394.  Id. at 893. 
 395.  Id. at 895. 
 396.  See id. at 895–96. 
 397.  Id. at 897. 
 398.  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211. 
 399.  Id. at 2217. 
 400.  Id. 
 401.  See id. at 2216–20. 
 402.  See id. at 2211–23. 
 403.  Id. at 2223–35 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 2235–46 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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in length, was slightly shorter.405F404  The length of each of the dissenting opinions 
indicates that the four Justices were adamant in voicing their views on 
their disagreement with the majority opinion.  The stated justification for 
overruling Miller and Smith was the invasiveness and comprehensiveness 
of the CSLI data; the majority opinion repeatedly cited to the concurring 
opinions of Justice Alito and Justice Sotomayor in Jones as precedent for 
Carpenter. 406F405 
There are a number of approaches to Fourth Amendment protection 
alluded to or that could have been used in Carpenter, but none of which 
were specifically endorsed as the underpinning of the opinion.  The following 
section reviews some of these approaches. 
D.  Theories Used to Decide Fourth Amendment Cases 
Can there be a single theory that would facilitate the courts in deciding 
Fourth Amendment cases?  As shown in Jones, Riley, and Carpenter, the 
Justices have never agreed on a single theory to use in weighing police 
conduct against an individual’s claim of privacy; nor have the Justices 
agreed on the breadth of a precedent. 407F406  As more fully explained in this 
Section, scholars have proposed several theories that might govern the Justices’ 
decision-making in Fourth Amendment cases, including the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test, the mosaic theory, the policy model, the 
equilibrium-adjustment theory, and the positive law model. 408F407  In addition, 
with the rapid advances in technology and social practice and the few 
Fourth Amendment technology cases decided by the Court, a judge may 
feel that the Court has provided little guidance and a judge may feel the 
conflict among the various Court precedents that might control the judge’s 
decision. 
 
 404.  Id. at 2246–61 (Alito. J., dissenting); id. at 2261–72 (Gorsuch. J., dissenting). 
 405.  Id. at 2215, 2217, 2220–22 (majority opinion). 
 406.  Compare id. at 2217–20 (announcing a narrow holding and not expressing a view 
on other collection techniques), with Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2477, 2484–85, 
2493 (2014) (announcing a balancing test to measure the individual’s privacy interest and 
the government’s policing interest, while rejecting a clear-cut rule), and United States v. 
Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 410–11 (2012) (announcing a clear rule that the GPS device on a car 
represented a clear physical trespass). 
 407.  Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 476, 480 (2011) [hereinafter Kerr, Equilibrium-Adjustment]; Orin S. Kerr, 
The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH L. REV. 311, 314, 344, 348 (2012) 
[hereinafter Kerr, Mosaic Theory]. 
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Is the use of the multiple theories to analyze Fourth Amendment cases 
a strength or a weakness?  Orin Kerr suggests that, because the settings in 
which the Fourth Amendment cases occur are so varied, the Justices’ use 
of a variety of different models has the advantage of allowing a judge to 
select which model to use depending on the particular facts of the case 
under review. 409F408  Other psychological processes may shape this judgment 
as well: a Justice conscious of the reaction of legal analysts might select 
the theory that best fits the Justice’s past reasoning in Fourth Amendment 
cases and that maintains the Justice’s esteem among Fourth Amendment 
advocates and scholars.  Because of the myriad Fourth Amendment theories 
to choose from, a judge might form an instinctual decision first—in the vein 
of Haidt’s social intuitionist model—and then search for the particular theory 
of Fourth Amendment interpretation that best supports that instinct.  This 
would be particularly true for new Justices who have yet to stake a position.  
Even aside from such considerations, each of the various tests has its own 
set of nuances that complicate a straightforward analysis. 
The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test.  The Katz reasonable 
expectation of privacy test has been very influential over the years, but 
the difficulty lies in what to examine in deciding whether an expectation 
of privacy is reasonable.  One could concentrate on privacy from the 
individual’s viewpoint of how likely it is for law enforcement to discover 
the information that the individual would otherwise consider private. 410F409  
The individual’s viewpoint is problematic because individuals do not have 
a single viewpoint.  The parameters circumscribing privacy differ in diverse 
settings and may be dependent on the individual’s personal characteristics, 
such as ethnicity, age, and social standing, and social practices, which 
transform over time especially when technology is involved.  In the alternative, 
one could examine the information retrieved by law enforcement and 
gauge the privacy level that law enforcement should accord, with the more 
private the information the more the Fourth Amendment should protect 
the information against law enforcement access. 411F410 
The Mosaic Theory.  The mosaic theory is the idea that longer term law 
enforcement surveillance permits the government to piece together a mosaic 
of an individual’s life.412F411  Justice Sotomayor was the first Justice to endorse 
the mosaic theory, although not by that name, in her concurrence in Jones.413F412  
Justice Alito also recognized in his concurrence in Jones that long-term 
 
 408.  Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 
503, 507 (2007). 
 409.  See id. at 508–12. 
 410.  See id. at 512–15. 
 411.  See Kerr, Mosaic Theory, supra note 407, at 314, 324–26, 339. 
 412.  565 U.S. 400, 415–16 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
BAST_PATRICK (DO NOT DELETE) 6/1/2020  3:46 PM 
[VOL. 57:  357, 2020]  Information Otherwise Unknowable 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 409 
monitoring by law enforcement posed a Fourth Amendment problem; three 
other Justices joined in Justice Alito’s concurrence. 414F413  The significance 
of the two concurrences means that at least five of the Justices felt  
comfortable with using the mosaic theory to a certain extent.  The mosaic 
theory does not provide much concrete guidance in at least three respects.  
The mosaic theory does not provide a test to determine the length of time 
required before law enforcement surveillance would be objectionable under 
the Fourth Amendment.  The mosaic theory fails to specify what type of 
technology would be subject to the theory.  The mosaic theory does not 
explain which of multiple law enforcement investigations a judge should 
aggregate to determine whether the theory applies. 
The Policy Model.  The policy model examines whether the Fourth 
Amendment should regulate police conduct in prohibiting law enforcement 
access to a suspect’s information by requiring law enforcement to obtain 
a warrant. 415F414  In the decade in which the Court decided Smith and Miller, 
the majority of the Justices did not view the third-party doctrine under the 
focus of today’s social practice of the individual being required to divulge 
extremely private information to third parties.  With today’s technology 
and social practices, the individual has no realistic option not to divulge the 
information unless the individual wants to live unconnected from today’s 
society. 
The Positive Law Model.  The positive law model of the Fourth 
Amendment looks at what activity would be unlawful for a private party 
to perform and equates that with a government violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.  Several scholars have disagreed as to whether positive law 
serves as a floor, pursuant to which law enforcement could be more heavily 
regulated than private individuals, or a ceiling, pursuant to which law 
enforcement is coextensive with the regulation of private individuals, in 
regulating law enforcement collection of an individual’s information. 416F415  
The positive law model provides flexibility to Fourth Amendment jurisdiction 
by changing as a legislature enacts new legislation.  One problem with the 
positive law model is that positive law differs among the various jurisdictions 
in the United States and it may differ at the different levels of government.  
An example of the potential conflict between local and state regulation is 
 
 413.  See id. at 418, 431 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 414.  See Kerr, supra note 408, at 519–22. 
 415.  See William Baude & James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth 
Amendment, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1888–89 (2016); Richard M. Re, The Positive Law 
Floor, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 313, 314 (2016). 
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the local government policies endorsing sanctuary cities.  Another problem 
is that positive law regulation of an invasion of privacy may lag behind 
the emergence of the privacy invasion, or positive law may discriminate 
against minorities. 
The Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory and the Normative Balancing Test.  
Orin Kerr proposes an equilibrium-adjustment theory that approaches a 
normative balancing test; the equilibrium-adjustment theory implements 
adjustment of the relative reach of law enforcement surveillance vis-à-vis 
personal liberty. 417F416  Under this theory, the Court broadens constitutional 
protection for the individual where technological progress encourages law 
enforcement to abuse its arbitrary and enhanced investigatory power; where 
technology limits law enforcement investigatory ability, the Court narrows 
the individual’s constitutional protection to permit law enforcement to do 
its job. 
Matthew Tokson characterizes Fourth Amendment cases as a blank slate.  
According to Tokson, the Fourth Amendment is a blank slate because the 
Constitution provides little guidance as how courts are to apply the Fourth 
Amendment except to the search of a home, and the challenges presented 
by technology and social practice exasperate the application of the Fourth 
Amendment. 418F417 
Tokson identifies the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test as a 
proxy test in that the test dictates the scope of Fourth Amendment protection; 
if the individual has an expectation of privacy and that expectation is 
reasonable, the Fourth Amendment protects against law enforcement 
interference with what the individual considers private. 419F418  The Katz proxy 
test has been inadequate over the years because Fourth Amendment privacy 
is extremely complex, advances in technology and social practice have 
made the Fourth Amendment unstable, and the potential application of the 
proxy test is very broad.420F419 
For Tokson, another approach is direct normative balancing, in which 
the Court directs the lower courts as to what considerations the courts should 
balance. 421F420  Over time, the courts flesh out the balancing test through rules, 
with a court able to apply a particular rule should a case come before that 
court that is similar to a dispute already covered by a rule.422F421  The balancing 
test is effective only when there is sufficient information available for a 
 
 416.  See Kerr, Equilibrium-Adjustment, supra note 407, 480–82, 487. 
 417.  Matthew Tokson, Blank Slates, 59 B.C. L. REV. 591, 594, 604–05 (2018). 
 418.  Id. at 609–10. 
 419.  Id. at 614–15. 
 420.  Id. at 608. 
 421.  Id. 
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court to perform the requisite balancing. 423F422  Both Kerr and Tokson 
are attempting to develop direct normative balancing tests that show some 
promise. 424F423  Perhaps these tests will have some influence on future cases 
that the Court decides that involve both technology and the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Kerr has also recently attempted to flesh out his equilibrium-adjustment 
theory with a multistep test; this test amounts to a normative balancing 
test that courts can use to determine if digital information receives Fourth 
Amendment protection against law enforcement. 425F424  Three requirements 
must be present for the test to apply.426F425  The first requirement is that the law 
enforcement surveillance to obtain non-content information must involve 
a digital age surveillance method. 427F426  The second requirement is that the 
individual must have created the information other than via voluntary choice; 
in other words, the individual created the information in a way required for 
the individual to engage with the modern world. 428F427  The third requirement 
is that the information is intimate in nature and outside legitimate law 
enforcement investigation. 429F428 
Tokson has also taken a stab at a normative balancing test. 430F429  At the 
heart of Tokson’s test is the identification of “three fundamental harms: 
(1) the avoidance of lawful activity because of fear of surveillance; (2) the 
harm to relationships and communications caused by observation; and (3) 
the concrete psychological or physical harm suffered due to surveillance.”431F430  
The test first requires one to weigh the benefit of law enforcement  
surveillance against the three harms. 432F431  The second step is to consider the 
availability of a less invasive method of law enforcement surveillance. 433F432  
The final step is to weigh the proposed surveillance method against the 
 
 422.  Id. at 645. 
 423.  Id. at 608–09; see Kerr, Equilibrium-Adjustment, supra note 407, at 525–26. 
 424.  Orin S. Kerr, Implementing Carpenter: The Digital Fourth Amendment 3 (Univ. 
S. Cal. Law Legal Studies Paper, Paper No. 18-29, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3301257 [https://perma.cc/6ZKC-TDZW]. 
 425.  Id. 
 426.  Id. 
 427.  Id. 
 428.  Id. 
 429.  Matthew Tokson, The Normative Fourth Amendment, 104 MINN. L. REV. 741, 
744 (2019). 
 430.  Id. at 752. 
 431.  Id. 
 432.  Id. 
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fundamental harms.434F433  If the surveillance method outweighs the fundamental 
harms, then a warrant is not required under the Fourth Amendment; however, 
if the fundamental harms outweigh the surveillance method, then a warrant 
or an exception to a warrant is required. 435F434 
E.  Analysis of Carpenter 
So how well do the various factors that go into judicial decision-making 
that this Article has covered here predict the outcome in Carpenter? 
First, as outlined earlier, two effective tools for gauging the anticipated 
reaction of the Justices are the comments and questions made during oral 
argument and the views the Justices expressed during the conference 
following the oral argument.  The one-hour oral argument 436F435 provides an 
interactive opportunity for the attorney advocates to highlight their best 
arguments and for the Justices to ask questions and comment.  According 
to some, “[O]ral argument also provides a venue for the justices to 
communicate among themselves and begin the process of coalition 
formation,”436437F  and provides the Justices’ opportunity for persuasion as a 
prelude to the judicial conference.437438F   One could predict from the Carpenter 
oral argument that Justice Sotomayor would be ruling in favor of Carpenter.  
In two instances, the Justice spoke for over two minutes in support of 
Carpenter.438439F   In his dissent, Justice Gorsuch backed the traditional property- 
based approach to the Fourth Amendment and was extremely critical of 
using the reasonable expectation of privacy test from Katz.439440F   Someone 
attending oral argument could have predicted Justice Gorsuch’s reasoning 
from the Justice repeatedly pressing the Deputy Solicitor General to answer 
a property-based hypothetical.440441F   Likewise, one could have predicted the 
nature of Justice Alito’s eventual dissent in the decision from his behavior 
during the oral argument: during Justice Gorsuch’s tough questioning of 
the Deputy Solicitor General, Justice Alito intervened twice to offer supportive 
comments.441442F  
 
 433.  Id. at 752–53. 
 434.  Id. 
 435.  SUP. CT. R. 28(3) (“Unless the Court directs otherwise, each side is allowed one-
half hour for argument.”). 
 436.  Jacobi & Sag, supra note 39, at 1168. 
 437.  Id. at 1208. 
 438.  See Transcript of Oral Argument at 13–14, 22–24, Carpenter v. United States, 
138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (No. 16-402). 
 439.  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2272 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 440.  See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 438, at 51–57. 
 441.  See id. at 55–56, 60–61. 
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Following oral argument, the Justices meet in conference to cast their 
initial votes on how the Court should the case.443F442  At some point, the public 
may have a glimpse into what transpired at the judicial conference when 
the instructions concerning the papers of one or more Justices release the 
notes documenting the judicial conferences. 444F443  Presumably, Chief Justice 
Roberts was in the majority at the conference and assigned to himself the 
authorship of the Carpenter majority opinion. 445F444  After Chief Justice 
Roberts produced the first draft of the opinion, he circulated the first draft 
to the other Justices for their reactions.446F445  The first draft is typically crucial 
in setting the path of the decision along a particular route.  Thus, Chief 
Justice Roberts retained a great deal of power over the Carpenter decision 
when he kept the authorship of the case for himself.  As indicated by the 
four dissenting opinions, the first draft did produce a number of reactions, 
to which Chief Justice Roberts probably responded. 447F446 
Another tool to gauge the anticipated reaction of the Justices is the amicus 
curiae briefs filed in the case.  Again, some scholars have found that the number 
of amicus curiae briefs, and, of those, the number filed by scholars, can 
indicate how the Court will rule in a case.448F447  In Carpenter, there were more 
than four times the number of briefs filed on behalf of Carpenter as were 
filed in favor of the United States.449F448  In addition, there were more than four 
times the number of briefs filed by scholars in favor of Carpenter as were 
filed in favor of the United States.450F449  Those numbers did accurately predict 
how the Court ruled. 
  
 
 442.  Supreme Court Procedures, supra note 81. 
 443.  See Marcia Coyle & Tony Mauro, 100-Year Restriction on Ginsburg Papers 





MKEB].  Each Justice is free to make whatever arrangement the Justice desires about when 
the Justice’s papers are released to the public, with the arrangements usually made known at 
the Justice’s death.  Id. 
 444.  See supra text accompanying note 109. 
 445.  See generally Supreme Court Procedures, supra note 81. 
 446.  See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018). 
 447.  DEVINS & BAUM, supra note 10, at 46, 48. 
 448.  Carpenter v. United States, SCOTUS BLOG, supra note 375. 
 449.  Id. 
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Carpenter, like many of the Fourth Amendment cases dealing with 
technology, is a special case in that the traditional pillars of judicial decision-
making—a Justice’s political ideology and philosophy on the role of  
precedent—recede somewhat to allow less traditional aspects of judicial 
decision-making to rise into the foreground.  This happens for two reasons.  
First, because there are so many different theories of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence to choose between, precedent becomes less constraining than 
it might otherwise be.  Second, because Fourth Amendment technology 
cases tend not to overlap as consistently with explicit political ideologies, 
there is less side-taking than in, say, cases concerning abortion or substantive 
due process.  As a result, the decisions in these cases can often be anomalous 
in their construction. 
For example, Carpenter may be modern in dealing with technology, but 
it is very much old-fashioned in the format in which the various Justices 
wrote their opinions.  The multiple opinions harken back to the earliest days 
of the Court with seriatim opinions.  The Court arrived at its current practice 
of issuing a majority opinion because Chief Justice John Marshall preferred 
that practice. 451F450  “The building of coalitions necessarily involves strategic 
choices not just with respect to outcomes but also content.”452F451  The number 
and diversity of the theory behind the various opinions may recognize the 
fractures present among the Justices in latching onto a single workable 
theory on which the Court bases modern Fourth Amendment cases. 
The far-reaching part of Carpenter is that one has constitutional protection 
for one’s detailed physical movements over a time period, that is, at least 
the seven days that were part of the facts of the length of surveillance. 453F452  
There is a lack of clarity on the parameters of this protection, in that 
Carpenter does not set a minimum length on the surveillance that would 
qualify law enforcement action for Fourth Amendment protection nor does 
the case explain if surveillance can be aggregated to meet the seven-day 
time period.  Some law enforcement authorities might interpret Carpenter 
as inapplicable to historical CSLI information a communications company 
captured a fair amount of time prior to by law enforcement analysis.  Thus, 
law enforcement could argue that there is no constitutional infirmity in 
gathering evidence via similar CSLI information without a warrant so long 
as the information is of a sufficient age that one would consider it historical.454F453  
 
 450.  GERHARDT, supra note 3, at 61. 
 451.  Id. at 62. 
 452.  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212–13, 2221 (2018). 
 453.  Ringrose, supra note 269, at 64. 
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Another argument is that law enforcement can freely use contemporaneous 
location information collected by pinging the suspect’s cell phone. 455F454 
However, the path by which the Court arrived at this far-reaching holding 
involved a 5–4 decision—with Justice Roberts siding with the traditionally 
liberal Justices and Justice Kennedy with the conservatives—that forced 
the majority to reckon with a complex record of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. 456F455  The 1967 Katz457F456 decision is not a super precedent but is 
extremely significant in the realm of privacy cases.  The reasonable expectation 
of privacy theory from Katz 458F457 is not without its problems of interpreting 
when an expectation of privacy is reasonable as applied to a particular set 
of facts.  But even with its problems, Katz has been influential over the years; 
Miller459F458 and Smith,460F459 from 1976 and 1979, might be seen as glosses on Katz 
that were the best the Court could do at the time without being prescient 
to the technology revolution of the past fifty years. 
Many had recognized that in the privacy realm the third-party doctrine 
was unworkable because the third-party doctrine was inconsistent with the 
public’s assumption of continuing privacy for information turned over to 
internet service providers and via cell phones. 461F460  Justice Sotomayor was 
sufficiently brave in her concurring opinion in United States v. Jones to 
acknowledge in writing that Miller and Smith had become largely unworkable, 
with their vitality questionable. 462F461  In her concurrence in Jones, Justice 
Sotomayor stated: “[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that 
an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information 
voluntarily disclosed to third parties.” 463F462  Then she added: “This approach 
 
 454.  See, e.g., Andres v. State, 254 So. 3d 283, 297 n.7 (Fla. 2018) (“[Carpenter] is 
not applicable to this case, where officers used real-time cell-site location information to 
locate Andres for the purposes of executing the warrant.”); Sims v. State, 569 S.W.3d 634, 
646 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019) (“Here, Appellant did not have a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in his physical movements or his location as reflected in the less than three hours 
of real-time CSLI records accessed by police by pinging his phone less than five times.”). 
 455.  See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211, 2222–23. 
 456.  389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 457.  Id. at 360–62 (Harlan, J., concurring); see supra notes 291–97 and accompanying 
text. 
 458.  425 U.S. 435, 438–40 (1976); see supra notes 304–10 and accompanying text. 
 459.  442 U.S. 735, 735–38 (1979); see supra notes 311–20 and accompanying text. 
 460.  Chao et al., supra note 247, at 266–67 (“[W]hen the Supreme Court is called to 
rule upon these new investigative techniques, the Court should refuse to apply the third 
party doctrine.”). 
 461.  565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 462.  Id. 
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is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information 
about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane 
tasks.”464F463 
Scholars criticized the Miller and Smith decisions roundly over the 
years;465F464 however, Chief Justice Roberts only garnered a bare majority to 
overrule those decisions, at least in part in Carpenter.  Although the cases 
in which the Court explicitly overrules constitutional precedent garner the 
most press, the Court explicitly overruling constitutional precedent occurs 
only infrequently.466F465  Chief Justice Roberts’ majority opinion in Carpenter 
did take the bold move of questioning the continued application of Miller 
and Smith,467F466 rather than implicitly overruling the two cases sub silentio.  
However, the majority opinion is similar to other cases that implicitly 
overruled precedent in that Carpenter leaves very open the way in which 
courts will interpret Carpenter in the future.  Chief Justice Roberts consciously 
drafted the opinion in such a narrow way that he could persuade a sufficient 
number of Justices to join in the majority.  On top of that, Chief Justice 
Roberts was careful to leave Miller and Smith viable, at least to a certain extent.  
Obviously, the Court does not lightly overturn the third-party doctrine, 
even in part.  The Court’s partial abrogation of the third-party doctrine was 
extremely slow in coming, even though most had recognized that the 
third-party doctrine did not continue to be viable.  Even though commentators 
had long questioned the viability of the third-party doctrine, the Court was 
loath to declare its death knell. 
The majority opinion in Carpenter incorporates the equilibrium-balancing 
theory, although not by name.  The Court reasoned: “In light of the deeply 
revealing nature of CSLI, its depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach, and 
the inescapable and automatic nature of its collection, the fact that such 
information is gathered by a third party does not make it any less deserving 
of Fourth Amendment protection.”468F467  The third-party doctrine had resulted 
in law enforcement having relatively free access to private information 
involuntarily turned over to third parties; in other words, technology and 
social practice aided law enforcement in a manner impossible prior to the 
digital age and left extremely private information accessible.  The equilibrium- 
balancing theory recognizes the tension between law enforcement investigative 
 
 463.  Id. 
 464.  See, e.g., Michael W. Price, Rethinking Privacy: Fourth Amendment “Papers” 
and the Third-Party Doctrine, 8 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 247, 264–66 (2016). 
 465.  See GERHARDT, supra note 3, at 9–11. 
 466.  138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217, 2220, 2230 (2018). 
 467.  Id. at 2223.  In his dissent, Justice Kennedy recognizes that the majority opinion 
is using a balancing test.  Id. at 2231 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  “When the privacy interests 
are weighty enough to ‘overcome’ the third-party disclosure, the Fourth Amendment’s 
protections apply.”  Id. at 2232. 
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power, on one hand, and the Fourth Amendment protection of the individual’s 
private information.  Technology and social practice tilted the pendulum 
in favor of law enforcement and to the detriment of individual privacy.  
Carpenter shifted the balance, which the third-party doctrine cocked toward 
law enforcement, back in favor of protecting the individual’s personal  
information. 
The Carpenter opinion anticipates the future of technology in applying 
to technology that law enforcement can use to provide information on one’s 
physical movements, or even infer a criminal motive to the suspect’s 
movements, and not being limited to CSLI metadata.  In a way, the opinion 
is more far-reaching than the facts in presenting the cell phone metadata 
as more invasive than it is in actuality.  The reality is that metadata places 
the cell phone owner within a particular neighborhood, but does not more 
accurately pinpoint the owner’s location, and the cell site captures metadata 
only when caller places a call. 
The Carpenter majority opinion is narrow in not entirely overruling Miller 
and Smith; however, Chief Justice Roberts was not a minimalist, nor does 
he show judicial restraint in the way in which he characterizes CSLI 
evidence.  The Carpenter opinion produced by the intermediate appellate 
court pointed out several interesting facts concerning the evidence used to 
convict Carpenter of a string of robberies.  One of the robbers confessed and 
provided Carpenter’s cell phone number. 469F468  At trial, seven accomplices 
identified Carpenter as the mastermind behind many of the robberies because 
he organized them, provided weapons for use in the robberies, and often 
served as a lookout by waiting outside a robbery site in a stolen vehicle. 470F469  
Expert testimony from an FBI agent showed that the CSLI placed the suspect 
within a half-mile to a two-mile range in the Detroit urban area. 471F470  Thus, 
at trial the CSLI data seemed to serve as corroboration of witness testimony 
in that the CSLI showed that Carpenter was located within a particular 
urban area, but the CSLI data did not more precisely pinpoint Carpenter’s 
location as outside the scene of any of the robberies. 472F471  The intermediate 
appellate decision emphasizes that the GPS used in Jones located the suspect 
 
 468.  United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 884 (6th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 
2206 (2018). 
 469.  Id. at 884–85. 
 470.  Id. at 885. 
 471.  See id. 
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within fifty feet, whereas CSLI located Carpenter only within one-half to 
two miles. 473F472 
Chief Justice Roberts took some liberties in describing the Carpenter 
facts.  The CSLI located Carpenter within a particular neighborhood, but 
Carpenter’s location was not as accurate as implied by the majority opinion.  
After providing a plain English explanation of the ubiquitous use of cell 
phones and an explanation of the generation of cell-site location information, 
Chief Justice Roberts summed up this background information by stating: 
“[M]odern cell phones generate increasingly vast amounts of increasingly 
precise CSLI.” 474F473  The majority opinion compared CSLI and the GPS 
monitoring done in Jones and drew a comparison between the two types 
of monitoring: “Much like GPS tracking of a vehicle, cell phone location 
information is detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled.”475F474  The 
majority opinion characterizes CSLI as providing GPS-like location 
information: “[W]hen the Government tracks the location of a cell phone 
it achieves near perfect surveillance, as if it had attached an ankle monitor 
to the phone’s user.”475476F   The majority opinion weaves in a view of the facts 
provided by CSLI that overstates today’s technological capability.  “Only 
the few without cell phones could escape this tireless and absolute  
surveillance.”476477F   Perhaps law enforcement will have this surveillance capacity 
in the future, but the opinion is far from minimalist and seemingly takes a 
top-down approach to communication technology.  “[T]he accuracy of CSLI 
is rapidly approaching GPS-level precision,” such that “wireless carriers 
already have the capability to pinpoint a phone’s location within 50 meters.”477478F  
Chief Justice Roberts recognizes the continuing validity of Miller and 
Smith while declining to broaden the third-party doctrine to include the 
“novel circumstances” of advancing technology and social practices resulting 
in an individual carrying a cell phone wherever the individual goes. 479F478  
“Given the unique nature of cell phone location records, the fact that the 
information is held by a third party does not by itself overcome the user’s 
claim to Fourth Amendment protection.” 480F479  The wording of the majority 
opinion assumes that the third-party doctrine never covered digital information.  
Thus, a close read of the wording of the majority opinion shows that the 
Court sticks strictly to the precedent of Miller and Smith by not overruling 
the two cases, but instead limiting the reach of Miller and Smith.  Chief 
 
 472.  Id. at 889. 
 473.  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212. 
 474.  Id. at 2216. 
 475.  Id. at 2218. 
 476.  Id. 
 477.  Id. at 2219. 
 478.  Id. at 2216–17. 
 479.  Id. at 2217. 
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Justice Roberts draws a line between Miller and Smith, on one hand, 
and Carpenter, on the other hand, by noting the difference in the type of 
information collected and the voluntariness with which the individual 
turned over the information to third parties.  CSLI provides “a detailed 
chronicle of a person’s physical presence compiled every day, every moment, 
over several years” and “in no meaningful sense does the user voluntarily 
‘assume the risk’ of turning over a comprehensive dossier of his physical 
movements.” 481F480 
The Chief Justice may have been more willing to compromise to include a 
line of reasoning than he would have had there been more than five Justices 
in the majority.  As this Article has covered, the need, both strategically 
and psychology, to court voters into a five-vote majority coalition can often 
influence the scope of a Justice’s decision.  The final Carpenter decision, 
like that in most other important cases, was certainly a collaborative effort 
of the Justices.  Although Chief Justice Roberts may have wanted to follow a 
particular policy preference, the wording of the majority opinion had 
to take into account a desire to garner as many Justices as possible joining 
in the majority opinion.  In other words, this happens to be one of the cases 
where the author of a majority opinion was somewhat constrained by what 
the author anticipates to be the reaction of the other Justices. 
The majority author’s line of reasoning is strategic in trying to reflect 
or approach what the author anticipates as the policy preferences of the 
other Justices.  In all probability, there was negotiation, or even a struggle, 
among the Justices as to the wording of the majority opinion and the final 
vote and alignment of the various Justices may or may not have been 
consistent with their initial votes cast in the case.  The Court did not announce 
Carpenter until almost the end of a Court term; the time pressure to get the 
last few cases decided may have outweighed the majority author’s amenability 
to revise the language of the opinion to win more votes for the majority 
opinion.  In the future, personal papers of one or more Justices deciding 
the case may provide light as to the give and take among the Justices until 
the Court announced the decision. 
Dissenting opinions typically highlight flaws in the reasoning of the 
majority opinion; however, concurring opinions can weaken the majority 
opinion by specifically referencing ways in which the concurring author 
believes the majority opinion to be inadequate.  Certain concurring opinions 
become more noteworthy than the majority opinion.  Prime examples of often 
 
 480.  Id. at 2220 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979)). 
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quoted concurring opinions concerning privacy include Justice Harlan’s 
concurring opinion in Katz and Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion 
in Jones.482F481  Justice Alito’s concurrence in Jones affected Carpenter by 
providing a rationale for the majority opinion in Carpenter. 483F482  Both 
concurring and dissenting opinions are more likely in the more important 
cases before the Court.  The timing of the announcement of the final decision 
in a case may be a factor in a Justice deciding to write a concurring opinion.  
Although a concurring opinion is generally shorter than a majority opinion, the 
concurring author still must factor in the time necessary to write a concurring 
opinion and may be loath to spend the time should the final decision happen 
near the final days of the Court term. 
As in Carpenter, the reader views the majority opinion as persuasive 
until one reads the concurring and dissenting opinions, which represent 
different possible ways to decide the case and back up the result advocated 
for with different paths of reasoning.  For example, Justice Kennedy’s dissent 
provides a more realistic view of the CSLI capability of pinpointing a 
suspect’s location: “[I]n urban areas cell-site records often would reveal 
the location of a cell phone user within an area covering between around 
a dozen and several hundred city blocks. . . .  By contrast, a Global Positioning 
System (GPS) can reveal an individual’s location within around 15 feet.”484F483  
With so many conflicting opinions presented by the Justices, one might 
conclude that the Justices were a little constrained by adhering to one overriding 
principle in deciding the case.  Carpenter, like many of the cases before 
the Court, was a complicated and difficult case.  One complication is that 
technology is the core around which the facts center, and technology is not 
the Court’s strong suit.  Another complication is the inability of the Court 
to reach a consensus on the best theory to decide a case concerning privacy 
and technology.  Justice Scalia’s majority decision in Jones, which Justice 
Scalia based on an ancient property law concept, is one indication that 
cases concerning privacy and technology might long present obstacles to 
easily reaching decisions.  Carpenter does cut back on the vitality of the 
third-party doctrine, but the case shows an extreme lack of consensus on 
the principles that the Justices agree to use in deciding future cases. 
 
 481.  See generally, e.g., Margin McKown, Fifty Years of Katz: A Look Back—and 
Forward—at the Influence of Justice Harlan’s Concurring Opinion on the Reasonable 
Expectation of Privacy, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 140 (2017); Matt Ford, Pleading 
for the Fourth, ATLANTIC (Nov. 12, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/ 
2015/11/justice-sotomayor-fourth-amendment/414948/ [https://perma.cc/7BHP-K3VZ]. 
 482.  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2215. 
 483.  Id. at 2225 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Research has revealed a multitude of factors that go into judicial 
decision-making.  Out of this multitude, the two influences that scholars 
and researchers tend to focus on the most are a Justice’s ideology, political 
or legal, and the precedential record in the area of dispute.  This focus 
appears to be warranted, as research has repeatedly demonstrated the predictive 
power of these factors. 485F484  Carpenter, however, provides a nice window 
into the judicial decision-making process because it allows us to see how 
the Justices side, and what other factors might be influencing their 
decision-making, when ideology and precedent are more diffuse and thus 
less determinative.  The narrowness of the opinion highlights the influence of 
coalitional dynamics.  Justice Robert’s siding with the traditionally liberal 
core in departing from the third-party doctrine suggests perhaps that his 
desire to establish a personal reputation as a consensus builder may 
trump his fidelity to precedent in this context.  Justice Gorsuch may have also 
been influenced by how he felt his colleagues or the public would perceive 
his actions when he decided to dissent from the majority opinion rather 
than concur, given that he essentially agreed in the decision but disagreed 
on the reasoning used to get there. 
In all likelihood, the membership on the Court will remain stable for the 
foreseeable future unless a Justice passes on.  For this reason, Carpenter 
may be the last privacy and technology case the Court decides for a while; 
the Court has yet to grant a petition for writ of certiorari in another privacy 
and technology case, and the Justices may not be willing to soon confront 
a case similar to Carpenter that results in the Court issuing a splintered 
decision.  As a result, it may be well into the future before we get another 
such window into decision-making at the level of the Supreme Court 
that is not dominated by ideology or precedent. 
  
 
 484.  See supra notes 5, 13, 37–72, 157–75 and accompanying text. 
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